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FOREWORD
This book is not intended to be a critical manual for the guidance
of those interested in studying mi litary tactics .
or is it meant to be a
glorified novel, or fiction, of an important battle of World War II. This
book is being published for the benefit of those individuals, chiefly the
idantrymen , tankers, and artillerymen, who fought and defeated the
Germans in this g reat battle. This book will attempt to show to that
individual what p:irt his particular unit played in connection with the
other units which were all tightening the noose around Mr. Adolph's
neck.
All too often a doughboy would take part in what was a decisive
battle of the war, or campaign, and come out of the battle with very
little knowledge of what he or his unit was trying to accomplish. He
likewise had very little knowledge what other friendly divisions, or
regiments were doing when hi s company was busy trying to capture a
tPwn, village, or cross roads. The author has spent considerable time
at the Adjutant Generals' Army Records Center, in Kansas City, as well
as at the Armored School, Fort Knox, in tracking down as far as possible
what part each division played in each day's action. Naturally, after 12
years many records have been destroyed. Where official records were
lacking, he has talked with many individuals, who took part in the Battle
of the Ruhr, to bring each unit' action into its proper perspective.
The "Battle of the Ruhr Pocket" actually took place during the
period from April 1 (when the pocket was do ed by the junction of the
Fir t and
inth Armies), until about April 19, 1945 , when the last
resistance took place near the Ruhr River. During this period over
825,000 men were locked in deadly combat. When it wa all over some
325,000 Germans were in the Prisoner of War stockades.
The author, in order to give the reader more of the background
ar!d preparation for the batt le, actually takes the reader back to the
cizure of the Remagan Bridge, and traces each division as it crosses the
Rhine and encountered the enemy in what later turned into the greatest
pincer movement the world has ever known.
Many books have been published on World \'<far II, but probablv
none touch on a battle or campaign which was so different from the
others than does this book. As you read this volume the publisher hopes
you are able to secure a better knowledge of the " Battle of the Ruhr
Pocket" as it unfolds before you in the peace and contentment of your
home and office.
The author of thi book remembers the Ruhr well. He served as a
combat infantryman throughout the entire engagement and when asked
today what he remembers mo t about the Ruhr replies ;
"Three thing -88's, 88's, and more 88's.
TIOGA BOOK PRE
Publisher
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Many large cities dorced rhe countryside in the Ruhr Pockec.

INTRODUCTION
One month before the end of World War II, one of the most
unusual, and yet decisive battles in the history of the world took place.
It was known as ' The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket" .
In this battle some 825,000 men locked in a life and death struggle,
and in this engagement the American army came out victorious, an<l
Hitler's once proud \V'ehrmach came out defeated-annihilated. Years
and years from now historians will look back at this great battle with
fascinated attention. It wi ll rank with Gettysburg, Stalingrad, and
\Vaterloo as one of the most decisive battles of all times.
Prior to the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket the German army still
maintained a strong defense lin e in the west, as well as on the Russian
front. The Germans, even though being forced to retreat behind the
Rhine, for an all out defense of the fatherland from the east bank of
the river, nevertheless maintained complete control of all units and had
a fairly static defense setup to hold the allies across the river.
However this plan was upset in early March 1945 when the 9th
Armored Division of the First Army in a bold and surpri~ing move
st:ized the railroad bridge at Remagan before the Germans h ad a chance
to destroy it. At once the 78th and 99th Infantry Divisions were rushed
atross the bridge and the Americans had a foothold, however feeble it
might be, on the east bank of the Rhine.
The demolition officer whose duty it was to destroy the bridge,
had his head removed from his body as a result of this great failure, but
that did not remedy th ings one bit as far as the military situation was
concerned. Within a few days the First Army was firmly established
e n the east bank of the Rhine.
Even though the Remagan Bridge was seized in a surprise move,
the overall p lans for the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket had been planned as
far back a 1912, when the Battle of Britain was till going on. While
the Luftwaffe showered bombs on London, Coventry, and Southampton.
a small planning staff known as COS AC (Chief of Staff, Supreme
Allied Command) drew up p lans which called for an eventual climax
cf the European War to take place in a great envelopment battle, which
would call for the encirclement and defeat of the Ruhr.
Y cs, the O\ era II plans cal led for an encirclement of the Ruhr sector.
Although the locations and actua l events took an unexpected turn with
the eizurc of the Rcmagan Bridge, these same overall plans drawn up
in England in 1942 were u ed.
As our armies poured across the Rhine at Remagan, British and
American units further north , above the Ruhr were pulling at the bits.
ready to leap across the Rhine and carry the war deep into the heart of
Hitler's homeland. Within a week from the time our forces broke out
of the Remagan bridgehead, and our northern group of armies crossed
the Rhine at \'lfescl, a huge pincer movement had been completed and
some 325,000 Germans were trapped in the Ruhr pocket.
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Thousands of Germans captured in th e R em aga n bridgehead were walked
back to our PW cages before th e Lund e ndorf bridge collapsed.

ever again, after the Battle of the Ruhr Pockc:t, were the German s
able to establi sh a defense line whatsoever. In the Batt le of the Ruh r, the
b:tckbone of H itler's army was destroyed, and a ll contro l of the war was
lost for good. There were many other engagemenb in the European
\Xfa r which were more heated ly contested, but none were as decisive a~
this b:tttle. After the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket our ,1rmies were free
t<1 roam the continent as they ~aw fit, and on ly scattered resist'.lllce cou ld
bc thrown up against them. The German war machine had trul y been
destroyed in the " B1ttle of the Ruh r."
What about the opposition encountered in the Ruh r? Some people
refer to it as sottered skirmishes. ft may be true that the Germ1ns
worted to a strong-point type of warfare in the Ruh r, but it 1s interesting
t0 note the following points in regard to the engagement in order to
realize the determined opposition that wa~ encountered in the Ruhr.
( l.) The inth Army casua lty Ji m for the week of April 3 w April 9 shc1we<l
a tocal of 2932 casualties. The following wc:ek of April 10 rhru April 16
chere were 2506 casualties. From the time che Ninth Army entered combat in
epcember, 19'1 t , to the en<l of the war in Europe, there were only four ocher
weekly peno<ls when the casual ries were hiµher . They were in November,
19'1'1, an<l rebruary 19'15, when the b'.tcer action north of Achen an<l the Roer
Ri ver rook plact. Besides the total casualties, there were only cwo weeks
when chere were more KJA's than there were during the week of April 3-9.
( 2.) The cankers suffered unusual losses <luring this perio<l also. The 7'10th
Tank Baccal1on, which was actache<l co che Heh Division and 86ch Divisi on,
suffered the loss of more tanks in che Barde of the R uh r Pocket th.in they Ji<l
in che Batcle of che Ardenncs , which was one of che mosc fierce baccles of
the war.
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(3.) The Ruhr was one of rhe prime targets of our Air Force from rhe early
days of rhe war. As chis was the center of che industry so necessary ro keep
che army in che field, ic was only natural char che Germans would defend chis
area from air arrack wirh every means possi ble. Ar nearly every village,
hamlec, and cross road in rhe Ruhr was located an anti-aircraft battery, bener
known as flak guns. The heavy fire encountered from chese guns resulted in
chis area being called by our air force boys as "flak alley." When the ground
forces neared che Ruhr, these flak guns were lowered and fired point blank into
our combat forces, resulting in heavy losses.

( 4.) Ir is crue che Germans did nor resort ro trench warfare or a solid defense
line in che Ruhr, but fell back and centered their defense around these strong
points, where chese flak bacreries were Jocaced.

The Battle of the Ruhr Pocket was fiercely fought by the Americans
as well as the enemy. Up to this time our GI's had not seen the horror
camps, where political prisoners, slave laborers, and prisoners of war
were forced to live like rats. But as we over-ran these prisons, and saw
with our own eyes what sordid conditions existed in these camps, a new
fighting spirit arose in the blood of the American troops. One and all,
there came a determination to get this war to an end and punish those
responsible for the atrocities so common as we moved along.
The stage was set for the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket in early March
1945, when the First Army seized the prize of the war, the Remagan
Bridge. As the few infantry and armored regiments in the bridgehead
il!,elf inched forward a foot at a time to secure a few miles of territory,
from which to launch an offensive, the other allied armies in the west
were likewise planning big things. The British, Canadian and four other
American armies had drawn up to the Rhine and only a signal from
General Eisenhower was needed before the grand offensive was on.
We shall not dwell on the earlier engagements (such as the crossing
of the Roer, the drive across the Cologne plain, and the battle of the
aar,) which indirectly led to the Battle of the Ruhr, in this volume.
Their place rightfully belong in another engagement.
In this volume we shall start with the period about five days after
the Remagan Bridge was siezed, when the First Army was preparing to
break out of the small bridgehead in which they were compressed. This
was the true beginning of the g reat engagement in which we are
interested.

The tread way bridge was used throughour Germany in the forever dangerous crossing of swift, mounrain screams.

CHAPTER 1
PRELUDE TO BATTLE
On March 13 the Twelfth Army Group issued a Jetter of instructiom
tn all field commanders which in effect set the stage for the future
operations which resulted in the encirclement of the Ruhr. General
Bradley ordered the First Army to proceed with the following missions:
( 1.) Continue to secure the Remagen Bridgehead from a point along the
Rhine near Bonn, in an arc thru Buisdorf, along the south bank of the Sieg
River, thru Uckerach, Epgerc, and Leucesdorf to a point on the Rhine downstream from Koblenz.

(2.) Defend che west bank of che Rhine River elsewhere from the
Army area in the north to the Third Army area in the south.

inch

At this point the First Army area extended from Worrington, on
the Rhine north of Cologne, all the way to Koblenz, where the Third
Army sector commenced.
In order to comply with the directive of March 13 issued by General
Bradley, the army commander of the First Army, General Hodges,
ordered a reshuffling of his divisions, and a general attack.
Operations in the First Army sector were to be conducted as follows:
( 1.) The VII CORPS (1st Army) was to consist of the 1st Infantry, 8th
Jnfancry, 78th Infantry, and 104th Infantry Divisions as well as the 3rd
Armored Division. This corps was co maintain contact with the 9ch Army on
the Rhine north of Colog ne, defend the west bank of the Rhine from Worring·
con to Bonn, and arcack out of the Remagen Bridgehead northward toward the
Sieg River. Thus the VII Corps was to operate on both banks of the Rhine
River at the same time.
(2.) The III Corps, consisting of the 9th Infant!)' Division, 99ch Infantry
Division and 9th Armored Division. The 7rh Armored Division was temporarily acrached as Army Reserve.
(3.) The V Corps was to maintain defensive positions along the Rhine in the
southern seccor of che First Army area.

In other words, the Fir t Army was ordered to break out of the
bridgehead, but the initial objective did not yet indicate the scope of
the attack, nor its accomp lishments.
On the morning of March 16 the attack was under way. The VII
orp a sumed control of the 78th Infantry Division in the bridgehead
area, and the fighting "Lightning" Division continued its attack northward. Konigswinter fell to the 78lh Division after an advance of some
2,000 yards downstream along the Rhine. Meanwhile the 9th Division
cleared everal towns in the central area of the bridgehead, now under
III Corp control. The 3rd Armored Division which had been in
defensive positions on the west bank of the Rhine near Cologne was
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rc:lieved by the 104th Division.
All along the Fir t Army front in the bridgehead area, the infantry
and armored units were cracking through the German positions and a
breakthrough was in the making. Within a very few days the 78th
Division had fought its way through rugged territory to within sight
of the banks of the Sieg River. The veteran lst Division attacked
through Wiessen and Betzdorf and were in a position to later defend
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AR.. MY
-:s .,
3So, ooo

C>ftOUf
M~r-1

u. s.
Three American armies were used to liquidate the Ruhr Pocket.

a perimeter on the south rim of the Ruhr P cket. The 8th Division had
relieved the L04th Division at Cologne and the T ir.iberwolvc:; mo ve.I
into the VIJ e tor of the bridgehead. In late March the 8th Division
wa relieved by the 86th Division and the 8th Division likewi ~c m ved
into the bridgehead.
The American First Army rolled into a full " Blitzkrieg" about
March 24, and within a few day~ American tank column had raced
all the way to the vicinity of Pac.lerborn and Lippstadt where a junction
wa made with the Ninth Army. With this junction the Ruhr Pocket was
born, or we hould say hatched .
pearheading this attack and the linkup with the Ninth Army wa~
VII Corps' 3rd Armored Divi ion, under the command of General
Maurice Rose. Fighting in clo~e contact with the 3rd Armored Divisio"l
was the veteran l 04th Di vi ion. These two unit carried the ball the
entire distance from the Rhine to Paderborn. A these divi ion raced
ir1to the north German plain, other divi ions turned off the main route
ol advance and lowly put up a "perimeter" defen ive po ition surrounding a large number of Nazis known to be trapped in the Ruhr.

PRELUDE

TO

BATTLE

13

T he Breakout From the Br idgehead
By March 20 the First Army was poised for a breakthrough. The
Remagan Bridgehead Battle, for all practical purposes was over. American
forces in the bridgehead were being built up at a rapid pace.
Statements by the hundreds of German prisoners now being interrogated by intell igence teams continued to describe the disorganization
and defeat in evidence behind the enemy lines. Only the iron-hand
control of the Nazi party leaders and top-ranking members of the SS
a11d German Army High Command prevented a breakdown of morale
and general collapse of the entire armed forces. It was on ly a matter of
time unti l they could no longer impose their will on the disillusioned
en listed man. Many of the officers taken prisoner during the latter part
of March clearly indicated that the German High Command feared a
breakthrough, and the enemy well knew that the chips were down, and
that there was no longer room to retreat.
Even the Air Force ha<l its demoralizing effects on the enemy. T he
Air Force day after day made repeated attacks on communication centers,
ordnance dumps, and supp ly insta ll ations. Prisoners reported a critical
shortage of fuel and ammun ition, as well as the one thing that keeps
a10 army going-food.
On March 20, General Hodges relayed to all unit commanders a
Letter of Instructions which outlined the future operations of the First
Army. These orders ma<le brief mention of the preparations in the north
for the . . Ninth Army in conjunction with the British 21st Army
roup to make an amphibious assault across the Rhine north of the
Ruhr. At the same time Patton 's Third Army was to direct its attention
tC>ward Frankfort au Main .
But the chief portion of these orders from General Hodges to all
unit commanders of the First Army was to state the immediate objectives
of the e units. At this time the III Corps in the Remagan Bridgehead
consisted of the following units: 9th Infantry Division , 99th Infantry
Division (with 18th Cavalry guadron attached); 9th Armored Division
in Corps re erve. On the west b;10k of the Rhine, between Remagan
and ologne the VII Corps was in defensive positions with the following
unit : 104th Division, 8th Infantry Division , 7th Armored Division.
Two units already in the brid,gehead the 78th Division, and the 1st
Infantry Divi ion- were fighting on the left flank in the bridgehead
area. The V Corps meanwhile protected the right flank of the First Army
"With two divisions, the 2nd Infantry and 69th Division.
The First Army battle plan called for an all out attack out of the
bridgehead area to commence about March 24. The drive would be
between the ieg River on the north and the Lahn River on the south
with the communication center of Limburg, on the Autobahn as the
lirst objective. Afer ecurin~ the hi,gh ground north of Limburg the
army was to attack toward Giessen and thus swing northeasterly toward
Kassell.
The general plan for attack out of the bridgehead called for the
VII Corps to continue current operations to secure the Sieg RiYer line
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as well as to maintain the defense west of the Rhine from the v1c1n1ty
of Bonn northward through Cologne to the Ninth Army area near Worrington. The VII Corps was to consist of the 1st Division, 8th Infantry
Division, 78th Division, 86th Jn fan try Division, and the I 04th Infantry
Division as well as the 3rd Armored Di vis ion .
(The VII Corps was at first assigned the mission of protecting the west bank
of the Rhine at Cologne. The 8th Infantry Division assumed this duty until
March 27 when they were relieved by the newly arrived 86th Infantry Division.
The 8th Diviison then moved through Bonn and into the bridgehead area
where they took over a portion of the front facing what within a few days
would become the Ruhr Pocket. A few days after the 86t h Infantry Division
went on line near Cologne, the U. S. 15th Army assumed control over the
front between the U. S. 9th Army and lst Army in the wesr. The 15th Army
at once relieved the 86rh Division with rhe 82nd Aii borne Division and the
86th Division reverted back to control of the VII Corps, and moved into the
Remagen Bridgehead area.)

It was the VII Corps whose duty it became to be the fhnking force
which closed the Ruhr Pocket. Once the attack out of Remagan wa~
under way, events went at a rapid pace. As the VTI orps raced around
the southern edge of the Ruhr to an eventua l linkup with the Ninth
Army, the III Corps would attack due east from Remagan with the 9th
Infantry and the 99th In fan try Division and the 7th Armored Division
The attack got under way on the morning of March 21f.
The 78th Infantry Division (with attached task force from the
3rd Armored Division) attacked toward the icg River cast of the Autobahn and seized Buisdorf and Ilennef. The 78th Division now main tained a fairly constant front along the Sieg River. This river served as
the defen ive line along the south flank of the Ruhr until the al l-out
attack to annihi late the Ruhr Pocket got under way about April 4-5.
(At this stage (March 24), it must be remembered there was no Ruhr Pocket;
in fact, the <mly troops east of the Rhine was the forces in the Remagen
Bridgehead. When we peak of the Ruhr Pocket at this time, the pocket as
it was after the linkup at Paderborn, is what is referred to.)

The !st Infantry Division attacked on the right of the 78th Division
and advanced toward tromberg and Wissen. As the 78th Division
pulled up to protect the extreme left flank of the First Army, the veteran
1st Division did li kewise further cast. To the right of the Red One, the
3rd Armored Division and the J01th "Timberwolf" Division teamed up
tr, spearhead the VII ,orps through Altenkirchen into central Germany.
At first, the VII orps met only moderate delaying action but
within a short time the enemy turned to bitter contested counterattacks. Enemy tanks began to appear in increasing numbers. On March
25 alone, in the 1st Division area, there were 45 artillery concentrations
which fired on enemy counter-attacks.
By March 26, our armored column were over 25 miles cast of the
Fhine and mo\ ing forward at a rapid pace. In the advance toward the
c>;..st, the 3rd Armored Division rntcr\!d and cleared Altenkirchen, "
communications center, as well as a German Army J feadquarters town.
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(A lcenkirchen was blown co a mass of ruin by our Air Force. When it became
known that the enemy was using the town as headquarters to direct the forces
opposing che Americans at Rt:magen, our Air Force struck the town
cime after time. By the time the tankers entered the city it was just one big
heap of rubble.)

As the First Army armored columns raced forward on March 27,
the 78th Division extended its front along the Sieg Ri ver all the way
from its mouth upstream to Stromberg, a distance of almost 30 miles.
This was an unusually long front for only one division to defend. The
1st Division protected the flank from the 78th Division area eastward,
to Wis en, which fell to the Red One on March 28.
By the last of March the VII Corps front covered 170 miles. VII
Corps elements now held a long front on the Sieg River. The 78th
Di vision was on the left, the nearest to the Rhine. The 8th Division
arrived from Cologne and went into line on the right of the 78th Di vis ion.
Th e 1st Di vision then side-stepped to the east and occupied the line
facing what was rapid ly becoming a trap for German forces. Further
cast, two regiments of the 104th Infantry D ivision dropped out of the
mad race northward to link up with the Ninth Army and attacked the
German units rapidly becoming surrounded in the Ruhr. Thus on
March 29 the following American units were engaged in defending 1
l•ne facing the Ruhr·-in order from left to right: 86th Infantry Di vision ,
78th Division , 8th Division, 1st Infantry Division , and 104th Di Yision. Meanwhile, The 3rd Armored Division was continuing the
llwking movement northward toward an eventual linkup with General
Simpson's army; an event which would take place within 48 hours.
The 3rd Armored Di\ ision registered gains on the right flank of
the VII Corps are:t that wou ld put Hitler's blitzkreig through France to
shame. On March 29 alone, General Rose's 3rd Armored Division
registered a 23 mile gain in the morning and a 16 mile gain in the
afternoon as it advancecl down the Frankenburg-Paderborn highway.
The Sieg River Line
On March 30, while other pnits of the VII Corps were engaged
in bitter defense of the ieg River line genera ll y running from Siegburg
tr1 Siegen , the 3rd Armored Division registered big gains on the east
flank of the corps area. The armored boys passed thru Brilon and
~dvanced further north to within three miles of Paderborn. Mopping up
i11 the rear of the armor was a regiment of the 104th Division. The
remainder of the I 01th Division w,LS on line facing the Ruhr. Protecting
the left flank of the 3rd Armored Division was the 4th Cavalry Group
and units of the 3rd Armored Di vision.
On March 31, previous rapid gains were consolidated by the movement of troops to strengthen weak flank areas and on ly slight advances
were made in a few places in the First Army area.
While we have been noting on ly the advance of the VH Corps the
past few days (as it was this unit which actually cut off and surrounded
the Ruhr) the other two corps in the First Army area were contributing

16

TH E B ATTLE OF T H E RUHR

POCKET

A doughboy eems alone in the world a he watches for a German sniper who
is operating from an upstairs window on che opposite side of this street.

their bit to the over-all ucce of the operations. The III orps, lightin ~
on the VIf orps flank, raced through Gie en and then swung north
t(.ward Mehlen before it wa pinched ut of line and prepared to swing
into action in the Ruh r Pocket. The III Corps advance wa spearheaded
by the 9th Infantry Di vision, 7th Armored Di vi ion and the 99th Infantry
Division. Further south the V Corp advance was spearheaded by thr
9th Armored Di vi ion with the 2nd Infantry Di vision abreast. Patton's
Third Army kept apace on the right flank of the V orp area.
The genera l ituation along the VII orps area front facing the
Ruhr on the morning of April I wa at best de cribed as confu ed. A the
First Army had raced eastward and then northward toward a linkup
"ith the Ninth Army, which wa to take place thi very day, di vi ions
which had dropped off enroute to contain the large erman forces in
the Ruhr found them elves defending long front , and were forced
tn space their units dangerous ly thin along the front line . Then, as the
German unit trapped within the pocket be_gan to realize that a vice was
bein,g closed around them, they attempted to break out of the trap,
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forcing the troops along the rim of the pocket to engage in a bitter
defense, in many cases vastly outnumbered. But to the credit of every
individual and unit involved, it must be stated that never at any time
during this period did they falter.
The front line along the southern edge of the pocket as of April 1,
was defended by the following units with their defense areas included.
86TH INFANTRY DIVJSJON - The 86th Division was responsible for the
defense of the west bank of the Rhine from the mouth of the Sieg River north
through Cologne to the Ninth Army area. Action along this front was limited
to patrols which were sent across the Rhine. The S6th Division was under the
control of the U. S. 15th Army, and was at this time in the process of being
relieved by the 82nd Airborne Division. The 86th Division was returned to
control of the First Army the next day.
78TH JNFA TRY DIVISION - Fighting as the left flank of the First
Army, the 78 th Division continued on the defense along the Sieg River from
its mouth upstream to Wissen. Patroling was the chief action in this area.
STH I FANTRY DIVISION - After being relieved near Colog ne by the
86th Division, the veteran 8th Division had moved into the Remagen Bridgehead area and was now defending a sector along the Sieg River from Wissen
to near Laaspe. Units of the 8th Division were engaged in bitter fighting in
the outskirts of Siegen, an important Ruhr industrial center.
4TH CAVALRY GROUP - The 4th Cavalry Group tankers were defending
a front running northeast from Laasphe. This group smashed one German
arm ored unit attempting a breakout trom the Ruhr.

.·

9TH INFANTRY DIV! ION - The Ninth Jnfancry Division had been
rapidly rushed north from the III Corps area near Giessen co fill a gap in~' che
front facing the Ruhr the previous day and was. on the defensive· on a front
extending rrom Berlberg northward to Med:J:iac~.
THE 104TH DIVISION-While some units of the 104th Division were mopping up in the rear of the rapidly 11dvanci}ig 3rd ·Armored Divisfon , other units
cf this division, sti!J under division .cQntrol; ~we;e defending· ch&' front line
facing the Ruhr in the vicinity of Korbach; as well as· Brilon . . J11e 4, Drh; lg- .
fanrry Regiment was meeting especia!Jy heavy enemy counter-attacks· by enemy ·
tanks and infantry, determined to break out of the Ruhr.
l T JNFANTR Y DIVISION - North of Brilon rhe Red One was moving
addit ional troops into a small salient near Buren.
3RD ARMORED DIV! ION - The 3rd Armored Thunderbolt which had
raced our of the Rtmagen Bridgehead only ten days ago was sri!J rolling and
had not yet stopped. The 3rd Armored raced through G oske in blinding
speed and late on April I made contact with the Ninth Army units near
Lippscad c.

A the First Army units approached Lippstadt, the Ninth Army
was known to be only a few mile5 away. Except for this narrow gap,
an c:ntire German Army, the elite of Hitler's Third Reich, was surrounded.
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CHAPTER 2
THE NINTH ARMY CROSSES THE RHINE
W h ile the First A rmy's cross ing of the Rhi ne had come rather
unex~ected ly,. and a surprise. to both allied and enemy forces, the Ninth
Army s cross ing. ?f the Rh me in the nor th was a well-planned and
~e ll -executed mil itary manuver. In fact, as far back as D -Day a select
staff of the 2l$t Army. Group (British ), under whose command Simpson's
Army was now figh ting, had been secretly planning a cross ing of the
Rhine barrier in this very neig hborhood. It must be recalled that the
master plan of the war called for the major assult of the Rhine to be in
the north . Naturally, the plans of Montgomery for a huge amph ibiou>
attack between Wese] and the mouth of the Rh ine suffered an upset when
Genera l Hodges' troops grabbed the Remagan Bridge and secured a
toe-hold on the east bank of the Rhine in early March. In fact, Mont~omery even proposed to SHAFE that the Remagan Bridgehead be
ahandoned so that it wou ld not interfere with the original plan to
attack in the north. Luckily, Eisenhower overruled Montgomery, and
the First Army was given the green-light to continue the build-up and
attack out of Remagan. Thousands of lives, both British and American,
were thus saved.
The assualt of the Rhine by the 21st Army Group in the north was
:l tremendous event. The U. S. 9th Army was to make the initial assault
near Wesel
with a simultaneous crossing by the British further downs:ream. The plans which had been drawn up nearly three years before
were not altered to any great extent.
Tons upon tons of bridging equipment were brought up from the
reu in Holland, as well as hundreds of pieces of naval landing craft.
(Ir was a pathetic sight in Holland and along the German frontier behind the
landing arc:-.i, ro see homes and business places which were simated alone thP
hiehway destroyed in order to make it possible to bring these landing craft
t·> the front. Many times these homes had completely escaped damage as the
actual fighting had passed rhru that particular area. As the engineers cleared
the parh in front of the naval craft, now mounted on huge tank retriever
trucks, an officer would knock on a door, and inform the civilian chat re must
remove h;mself and hi possessions within ten minutes as his heme would have
to be destroyed . Any protc t was unnecessary this was war. Within a few
m'nutes a bull-dozer would turn the house into a ruin, and the landing craft
would m :)Ve forward until the next obstacle appeared in the way. The civilian
o' cupanr would stand in a daze and wonder in amazement what had happpned.
Th is rather cruel event occurred many times in the area, where a house built
near the road would not allow sufficient room for the bulky loads to pass.)

ecessary supplies and supporting equipment were brought forward
tn the comb1t units. The 79th Infantry Division and the 30th Infantry
011 ision were withdrawn from the front and taken to Holland where
tliey underwent ten days of extensi\e amphibious tra•nin~ along the
Meu e River.
On March 23, the assault divisions moved into advance positions,
and D-Day was set for March 21. The plan of attack ca lled for the
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30th Di.vi.si.on to attack. on the left flank of the XVI Corp area and the
79th D1VJs1on on the right. H-Hour was to be at 0200 on the morning
o( March 24. At approximately the same time, the 17th Airborne
Division was to be dropped a few miles behind the enemy li nes. Thus,
in the Ninth Army area, the Rhine assault was to take place with three divisions in the initial attack. Tn support of this attack three divisions
were held in reserve by the XVI orps, ready to be rushed across the
Rhine once a bridgehead was secured and sufficent manuver room was
a'·ailable. These were the 75th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division,
and 8th Armored Division.
To the south of the actual crossing sites, the XIII Corps was in
defensive position, holding the west bank of the Rhine southward to the
First Army boundary near Worrington, a suburb of Cologne.
The attack was underway at 0100 on the morning of March 24
\~ hen a sixty minute artillery barrage that will never be forgotten in the
Rhineland commenced. A total of L,087 shells were fired into the enemy
positions every minute. A total of 25,261 rounds were fired into tht.:
enemy positions within one hour. Ten thousand allied planes ran~ed
over the landing area and far into the German rear attacking everythrnf;
oi military value within sight.

American infantrymen ride tank in advancing thcu one city in the Ruhr
Pocket, which had only recently been cleared of the enemy.
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The 30th and 79th Division c01~ b:it te:ims attacked just as the dust
from the air and artillery attack was Hting. The infantrymen found the
bi.rrage had left most of the defenders in a dlZed condition, and by 0600
the beachhead was firmly established. Prisoners captured related that the
XVI Corps troops had overran their position s before they had time to
emerge from their dug-in positions. By 1530 the first day, a 1, 150
foot treadway bridge W:lS placed in opention acrors the R"1ine.
. On. March 25, the Ninth Army troops expanded the bridgehead to
eight miles 111 depth and seven miles in width. The 30th Divi sion was
advancing toward the Lippe Can:il and wa~ meeting fierce resistance
near the Autobahn which transversed the area. The 79th Division on the
southern flank was advancing slow ly past Letkamshof. The 17th Airborne
Division maintained cont1ct on the northern flank of the corps area, with
friendly British troops expandin~ out of their bridgehead further north.
Two days after the first crossing in this area, the attack out of the
bridgehead was underway. While the 17th Airborne and 30th Jn fantrv
Divi ions were fighting across open fields in the northern flank of the.
XVI Corps area, the 79th Division attar'.:cd throu~h one small town
after another in the general direction of the Ruhr River. In fact, advancing 79th Division infontr/men were n::iw within sight of the smokestack~
of the Ruhr industrial areas near Dorsten. One rel.(iment of the 35th
Division entered the b1ttle when they passed throu~h the 79th Division
and gained almost two miles. The XVI Corps front in the bridgehead
area now extended alrr>o<t to the Rhine-Herne anal, which was the
initial objective. Howeve r. the eneMy w1s resisting the bridgehead with
many tank-led counter-at'al'.'1.:". But the Americans were firmly established
on the east bank of the Rhine and failed to g ive ground to any of the
Boche attacks.
By March 28 the N;nth Army bridgehead had expanded and the
i:1fantrymen were in a general advarce. The 79~h Division moved into
Hamborn and captured the once i;reat Thys~e n Steel Works, which was
now only a mass of twisted girJe;s and wrecked machinery. The 79th
Division was alreadv in a p')rtion of the Ruhr and was clearing a lari~e
area in the triangle formed by the junction of the Rhine and Ruhr Rivers.
The division established a defense along the northern bank of the RhineJlerne Canal on thi Jay. The 8th Armored Division entered the b1ttle
thi date and advanced several miles toward the east, with the 35th
Division as i ting. The units were within one mile of the lan5e city of
Dor ten.
Dorsten is Captured
Dor ten, one of the more important Ruhr industrial centers, was
ca ptured by the 8th Annored Divis:on after a fierce battle supported bv
eleven artillery batteries. The town w:1s secured about noon on March 29.
and the tankers had advanced four miles beyond to cholven by ni~htfall .
On their right flank the 79th Division was in defensive position along
the north bank of the Rhine-Herne Canal. However. the word defense
i ~ rather unfair, as this unit underwent terrific puni hment from fire
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from concrete pillboxes in their are 1. These obstacles had to be cleared b;
the "Cross of Lorraine" doughboys during the day.
.
The .date of 30 M arch 1945, saw the XVI Corps consolidate positions
in. the bridgehead area. The front line of the corps area from the Rhine
River eastward found the 79th Di vision fighting along the b:rnks of the
canal. The 35 th Division, having already captured Gladbach and the
8th Armored Di vi.sion advanced slowly due cast on the corps left boundry.
The 30~h. :vas relieved from attachment to the corps and along with the
75th Di vision were assembling for future operations. By March 30, the
XVI Corps fro~t ran along the Rhine-H erne Canal all the way from the
Rhrne near Duisburg for 13 miles to near Bottrop. This front directly
faced what within a few days would be the Ruhr Pocket. As noted above.
the 79th and 35th Divisions held this line along the Rhine-Herne Canal.
Meanwhile, the 8th Armored Division and the 75th Division were
fighting some 25 miles east of the Rhine toward Reck linghausen and
along the Lippe Ri ver. On their left flank was the British Second Army.
Tn other words, as of March 3 1, the Ninth Army was committed ea~t
of the Rhine with one corps, whose front lay between the Rhine-Hern e
Canal and the Lippe River. Another corps, the XIII, maintained defensive positions along the west bank of the Rhine, oppo ite Dusseldorf.
This sector wa soon to be turned over to comp lete contro l of the
Fifteenth Army, as was the defensive area controlled by the First Arm}
near Cologne.
While the XVI Corp was slow ly m,oving into po ition along the
Rhine-Herne anal from the vicinity of Dui sburg, northca tward some
25 miles, important thing were happen ing further north in an area
recently tran ferred from the control of the British ccond Army to the
U. . Ninth Army.
A oon a po siblc after the securing of the Wesel Bridgehead,
General impson moved both the XIII Corps and the XIX Corp across
the Rhine, and by March 29, all three corps of the Ninth Army were
ready for commitment. At the same time the defense of the Rhine
River line, on the we t, was turned over to the new Fifteenth Army, and
the 97th Infantry Di vision took over this cctor of the front.
On March 30, General impson outlined the immediate future for
his three corp , all of which were now committed on the ca t bank of the
river. His plans were briefly a foll ow :
XVI CORP tarting at the Rhine River and moving eastwa rd along the
banks of the Rhine Herne Canal, the i9th Tnfantry Division, ?5th Divi•ion
and 75th Division were to protecr the canal :ind defend aggressively along a line
running on the north and west banks of the canal. The Corps was instructed
to be prepared to assume control of the right flank of the 9th Army from the
Rhine to Paderborn .
XJX CORP - This Corps was co initially consist of the 2nd and 8th
Armored Divisions, and the 30th, 83rd and 95rh Infantry Divisions. The XIX
Corps was instructed co strike out of the Wesel Bridgehead along the northern
llank of the Ruhr and to attempt to make contact with elements of the Firsr
Army known to be advancing northward toward Paderborn. This orps would
serve as the II.inking unic on the north of the Ruhr as did the VII Corps on
the south, as we have already noted . The 2nd Armored Division broke our of
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the br:dgehead during the night of March 30, heading due east, with the 83rd
Infantry Division on their right flank. These two units carried the ball right
into Paderborn and Lippstadt, for the linkup with the First Army. In the
meantime b:.ith the 95th Division and the 8th Armored Division swung south
in the Corps area to protect the front facing the Ruhr.
XIII CORPS - This corps was ordered to attack eastward also in conjunction
with the attack by th e 2nd Armored Division and the 83rd Infantry Division.
This area of advance was further north than the XIX Corps. The 17th Airborne Division, 84th Infantry Division, 102nd Infantry Division and the 5th
Armored Division rook part in the offensive in this area.

The offensive out of the bridgehead to an eventual link-up with the
First Army got under way on March 30 when the 2nd Armored Division,
of the XIX Corps, struck east from the vicinity of Haltern and Dulman.
Del ayed on ly a few hours by bl own bridges over the Ems Canal, the
2nd Armored began rolling eastward at a rapid rate, almost without
opposition, toward a linkup that would trap some 325,000 troops in the
Ruhr. The industrial heart of Germany was in imminent danger of
encirclement. Thus was the end of March for Hitler on the Ninth Arm?
front.

An anti-aircraft unit moves forward under a bombed German railroad bridge.

...

CHAPTER 3
THE MEETING OF THE ARMIES
Easter unday, April 1, 1945, will long be remembered as "B lack
Sunday" for the German forces on the western front. On that memorable
elate the advancing armies of General Eisenhower establi shed contact
near Lippstadt, thus trapping ome 325,000 German troops in the highly
industrialized Ruhr va lley. About 1600, on April l, spearheading tank
columns from the 2nd Armored Division (Ninth Army) and the 3rd
Armored Division (First Army) met on the outskirts of Lippstadt. This
linking of the two forces closed a vice on General Model's entire Army
Group B, which had been defending the central sector of the western
front. Also trapped with Model's forces was a great portion of the Fifth
Panzer Army and the First Parachute Army.
Besides the enemy armed forces trapped in the Ruhr, the drive
also deprived the enemy of the use of her greatest industrial area, for
the manufacture of war supplies, so necessary for the continU1tion of the
war. De pite the numerou air attacks which had been taking place
almost nightly for some four years, many German war plants had continued to operate right up to within a few hours of their capture by
American forces.
A statement by General of the Army Dwight David Eisenhower.
upreme ommander of the Allied Force . issued on April 3, stressed
the importance of the accomplishment · of the units which had taken
part in the encirclement of the Ruhr. General Eisenhower said:
The encirclement of the Ruhr by a wide pincer movement has cur off the whole
Army Group B and parts of Army Grouo 11, rhus forming a large pocket of
enemy troops wh ose face is scaled and who arc ripe for annihilation. The
most viral indusrrial area is denied to the German war poccntial. This magnificent feat of arm will bring the war more rapidly to a close. It will long be
remembered in liisrory as an oumandinp; battle - the battle of the Ruhr.
-General Eisenhower

\Xi'ith the Ruhr at la1;t ~e1leJ o'f a general reshuffling of unit , and
Loundries . took place from April l through April 5. The general attack
to liquidate the Ruhr cFd not get underwa\' in full strength until April 6.
Al houi(h m.rny determined battle took place during these few days, most
oi them were ;tggressi' e patrols in force, mainly to test the enemy's
determination and stren~th .
With the closing of the Ruhr Pocket, General Ei enhower was faced
"ith a problem . Would it be best to practice a policy of containment of
the surrounded troop in the Ruhr by setting up a defense perimenter
~ round the Ruhr manned by a few American Divisions while the main
body of the arm;es raced on eastward to capture Berlin and meet the
Russians ; or would it be be~t to draw up to the Elbe River and set back
tu wait until this huge pocket of enemy soldiers in the rear areas could
be di~estcd . Ei cnhower decided the safest course would be to clear
the rear fir t, thus climinatin~ any threat that the surrounded forces mir~ht
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break out and disrupt his line of communic1tion toward the ea~t.
On April 2, a staff meeting was held by the army comr.1anders at
which time a general plan of attack for the Iiguidation of the Ruh r
Pocket was worked out. The plan was rather simple.
l. The U. S. 15th Army was co maintain a defense line along the wesc bank of

the Rhine from Bonn to Duisburg. Three divisions were to be used for this
purpose.
2. The U.S. 9ch Army was to make a converging attack in to che highly built-up
industrial area of che Ruhr with che XVI Corps crossing che Rhine-llerne
Canal and striking south to the Ruhr River while elements of che XIX
Corp were co actack from the Hamm-Lippsradt area toward che Ruhr River.
3. The U. . lsc Army was to clear the densely wooded area to che sonh of
che Ruhr River and scrike north co che Ruhr co form a link with the 9ch
Army. The XV Ill Airborne Corps was assigned to First Army for ch ·s
mission along with che Ill Corps.
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The American divisions employed in the Ruhr campaign all had a common
purpose - dcHru<:tion of the enemy. Thi\ \ketch show\ the general route of
advance of each divi\ion.
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Immediately upon return to their Command Posts, the three Army
commanders set in motion a regrouping of their forces in order to comply
with the above instructions, and in the case of both the First and Ninth
,;,rmies, to continue the attack toward the Elbe River.
In the Fifteenth Army area, the 82nd Airborne Division relieved
the 86th Infantry Division at Cologne, and the lOlst Airborne Division
relieved the 97th Division opposite Dus~eldorf. The 94th Infantry
Division relieved the 95th Division to the north. Thus on the west bank
of the Rhine, moving from north to south, the Fifteenth Army had
the 94th, lOlst and 82nd Divisions on line facing the Ruhr Pocket.
In the First Army area, the XVIII Airborne Corps assumed control
of the sector adjacent to the Rhine River, and running generally along
the Sieg River. In this sector, the 97th Infantry Division moved into
position nearest to the Rhine. (Midway in the Ruhr Pocket batt le, the
13th Armored Division took up a position along the Rhine as the 97th
Division sidestepped east.) The 78th Infantry Division , 8th Infantry
Division and the 86th Infantry Dvision were on line in that order moving
from the Rhine eastward. The III Corps moved up from. the vicinity
o~ Weissen and assumed control over an area of the front from near the
Hunden River northward to near Lippstadt. Units in position in this
area prior to the general atack were the 99th Infantry Division, 7th
Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division (later to be relieved by
the 5th Infantry Division.)
In the Ninth Army area the XVI Corps maintained positions facing
the Rhine-Herne Canal with the 17th Airborne Division taking over the
right flank of the
inth Army adjacent to the Rhine River. The 79th
Division side-slipped to the cast, and moving in clockwise around the
riorth flank of the Ruhr in the XVI Corps area was the 35th and 75th
Infantry Division . The XIX Corp attacked into the Ruhr with the
95th Infant~y Division and the 8th Armored Division , reinforced by
the l 94th Glider Infantry Regiment. These units relieved the 83rd
Infantry Division which then rejoined the units of the Ninth Arm y
1110\in~ toward the Elbe River east of Paderborn.
Thus we find on April 5, the circle around the Ruhr Pocket, as the
American armies prepared to j!.O on the offensive, held by the following
units
starting at Bonn , and moving counter-clock wise around the
Ruhr Pocket.
FIR T ARMY
XVlll Airborne Corps
97rh Infantry Division
78rh lnfantry Division
8th Infantry Division
86th Tnfantry Division
llI Cnrps
99th Infantry Division
7th Armored Division
9th Infantry Division

TH ARMY
XIX Corps
191rh Glider Infantry RCT
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8rh Armored Division
95rh lnfanrry Division

XVI CORPS
75rh
35th
79th
l 7rh

lnfanrry Division
Infantry Division
Infantry Division
Airborne Division

FIFTEENTH ARMY
XXII Corps
94th lnfanrry Division
10 I st Airborne Division
82nd Airborne Division

The order of battle for the coming phase of the war that wou ld sec
ar entire German Army Group comp lete ly destroyed within a period
of less than two weeks, ~hows no less than 17 divisions committed to
this one battle. However, before the battle was over the 5th In fantry
Division, 13th Armored Division, and 4th Cavalry quadron would take
part in the clash. Previously, the 1st Infantry Division, 83rd fn fantry
Division, 104th Infantry Division, 2nd Armored Division and 3rd
Armored Division had all taken an outstanding part in the battle of the
Ruhr. Therefore, in all it took some 2 American Divisions to anni hil ate
the Ruhr. Also, it will be noted that all three American Airborne
cl:visions were committed to action in this battle. This was the on ly tim<'
during World War II when Eisenhower used all three of his crack
airborne di\isions in one: engagement.
While awaiting the genera l kickoff of the big offensive to annihilate
the Ruhr Pocket, the Ninth Army forces in the north, in particuhr the
xvr Corps, m,tde se\eral offensive moves on April -1 and 5 to pave th.:
way for the gener,tl offensive which was to get underway on April 6.
In the 75th Division area, rnmbat patrol<; were sent across the
Dortmund Fms Canal and sernred a bridgelwad on the boundry between
the 75th and 35th Divisions which rnulcl be med once the main attac!~
vvas u11dernay. One entire rnmpany was sent on patrol behind the enemy
lines and returned with a bag of 55 prisoners. A bridgehead of some
he miles in length across the Ems C.tnal had been built up by the 75th
Di\ision prior to the main offenme. Likewise on the south flrnk of the
Euhr Pocket, the 78th Infantry .tnd 8th Infantry Di\ isions had <tlso done
extensive p.1troling along the Sieg River and both units h.1d est.ihl ishecl
a bridgehe,ul across the ieg thru which the 97th fnfantry and 86th
I1 :fantry Di\isions would pass on the morning of April 6 when the
attack would ~ct underway.
Pcrh.1ps it would be wise to stop at this ti mt and rev icw the terrain
that the B.ittle of the Ruhr Pmket would actually be fought over.
In the north, in the Ninth Army sector, the north German Plain
'' ould be the chief battle ground. Gencr.1lly speaking, open countryside
clotted by many small vill.tges and large 111dustri.l1 centers, would be the
tcrritorr thru which
inth Arni} units would be li~hting. The Ruhr
River \'alley is intersected by many smaller strc.uns ,rnd man-made can.tis,
most of them with hiµh, stc:ep banks, often protected with dikes. Thes(·
c:nbankments m.ide wonderful b.irricrs from which the erm,ins could
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defend every inch of oil , with the least effort and use of manpower .
The land along the north bank of the Ruhr lies very leve l; however,
east of Dortmund, toward Soest and Brilon, the countryside gets very
hilly and dense woods are the general rule. Another obstacle often
encountered north of the Ruhr River was huge slagpi les, some almost
like baby mountains. These, too, were just designed for the use by
defending troops.
South of the Ruhr River, in the First Army area, the countryside was
indeed a dukes mixture. In certain areas, such as along the Rhine River
opposite Cologne, the countrys ide was rather open and level. But further
east, in particular in the area through which the 8th, 86th, and 99th
Infantry Divisions must advance, the terrain was made for mountain
goats. One huge hill (in fact they would best be called mountains)
after another wou ld be encountered. All of these hill s were densely
covered with vegetation. In places the forest was so dense that it was
almost impassable to humans. Perhaps deer and wild boar cou ld transverse
it but even that is doubtful. This was the most difficult terra in encoun -·
tered by American force in the European Theatre, with the possible
eJ1.ception of the Eifel area along the Belgian-German border.
The area through which the infantryman would be forced to figh t
had been known to airmen for over two years a the flak belt, as thousands
of anti-aircraft emplacements were located in a belt surrounding the
Ruhr cities. These ack-ack units were unexpectedly turned into anti·
rersonnel guns during the Ruhr campaign, and when turned into a ground
v1eapon, they can make an extremely d ifficu lt position.

Tons of war supplies were found scored in German churches, placed cbere by
chc azis, in an effort to prevent cbeir being bornhcd by our airforce.

CHAPTER 4
THE BIG PICTURE
The consolid ated attack to complete ly liquid ate the Ruhr Pocket
,,·as scheduled to get underway on the morning of April 6. By that time
the three American :i.rmies fac ing the Ruhr had sufficient tir.1e to regroup
forces, and prepare for a general offensive.
It must be remembered that for five days preceding this great
offensive, all of the divisions engaged in the Ruhr Campaign h ad dug in
and were actually on the defense. Numerous German counter.attacks.
and attempts to break out of the pocket had occurred, and many casualties
had been suffered by both sid es. The most serious of the counter·attacks
had occurred north of Hamm, where the 95th Di vision was bruised severa l
times, and in the vicini ty of Wissen, in the 8th Di vision area, where a5
many as twelve major counter.attacks occured on the 2nd day of April.
Wissen, located on the south bank of the Sieg Ri ver, was the scene
of a bloody battle on that date also, when German infantry infi ltrated
across the ieg and surrounded two co111 panies of the 1st Battalion,
28th Infantry Regiment (8th Division). These Gis held on desperately,
wh ile other doughboys rushed to their aid. After relieving these troops.
the regiment was then forced to clea1 the town of Wiessen for the second
time.
The over all plan to annihi late the German forces in the Ruhr was
sent down to unit commanders on the night of April 4, and in general
it was as follows:
I. Operations from the West
(a) The XXJI Corps of the 15th Army will continue to defend the west
bank of the Rhine from Duisburg to Bonn. This Corps will also lend
whatever fire support possible to advancing units on the east bank. Offen·
sive action shall be limited to aggressive patrols across the river to keep as
many enemy troops as possible engaged . The 82nd Airborne, lOlst Airborne, and 94th Infantry Division shall be used for this purpose.

.

2. Operations from the outh: The attack from the south shall be in three
main efforts.
(a) The main effort in the south shall be a coordinated drive right through
the center of the pocket. The XVIII Corps, under the command of General
Matthew Ridgeway, will make use of the 8th Tnfantry Division and the 86th
Jnfanrry Division, with the attached 740th Tank Battalion for this purpose.
These divisions shall attack norrhward and attempt co split the Ruhr Pocket
into rwo separate pockets in the vicinity of Hagen. They shall also protect
the right flank of the XVI II Airborne Co rps and maintain contact with the
Ill Corps of the right.
( b) The XV!Il Airborne Corps shall also attack northward along the east
bank of the Rhine with the 9 7th Infantry Division and the 78th Infantry
Division. The 13th Armored Division shall be in reserve and committed
once the rerrain is suitable. These units shall advance northward toward
Dusseldorf in coordination with the 8th Division and the 86th Division on
the right flank of th is corps area.
(c ) The third major drive from the south by the Ill Corps, under the
command of General Van Fleet, using the 99th Infantry Divi ion, 7th
Armored Division, and the 9th Infantry Division. The 5th Infantry Division shall relieve the 9th Division once it arrives in the area. The II I Corps
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shall advance northwestward from the present lines and clear all territory
south of the Ruhr and east of the Lenne River. The corps shall maintain
contact with the 86ch Division of the XVlll Airborne Corps on the left
flank and with units of the Ninth Army on the right flank.
(d) The mission of all units of the XVIIl Corps and Ill Corps is co clear
all territory south of the Ruhr River. The army objective is the Ruhr River,
where contact will be made with the Ninth Army.
3. Operations from the North: The attack will be south and west from present
positions.
(a) The XVl Corps shall attack acn,ss the Rhine-Herne Canal from the
present defense line, using the 17th Airborne Division, 79th Infantry Division, 35th Infantry Division and the 75th Jnfantry Division. The corps shall
clear all the territory north of the Ruhr River anJ capture any bridges
possible across the river for use by the forces advancing frcm the south.
Numerous Prisoner of War Scalags and Slave labor camps we1e expected to
be found in the area of advance, especiallr near the large inJusrr:al areas.
The corps shall also maintain contact with friendly forces on the left flank.
(b) The XIX Corps shall attack westward from present positions near
lippstadt. As the corps is also committed on the front facing the Elbe River,
a task force shall be formed unJer command of the Commanding General
of the 95th Infantry Division to assume control of all XIX Corps units in
the Ruhr. As soon as possible, all XJX Corps units shall come under control of the CG of XVI Corps. This Task Force will engage the enemy using
the 95ch Infantry Division, 8th Armored Division, and rhe l94th Glid er
Infantry Reg iment of the 17th Airborne Division. The 4th Cavalry Group
shall be attached to this task force co protect the left flank and maintain
contact with First Army units advancing from the south.
( c) The mission of all Ninth Army units is to clear all territory north of
the Ruhr River and to assume military government control of all territory
captured.

As the battle order for the offensive to clear the Ruhr Pocket was
given to the unit commanders, the battle lines were drawn pretty much
as follows: The Rhine Ri\C:r naturally formed the western boundary of
the pocket. The Ruhr and the Rhine-! Terne Canal formed the defen e
line to near Munster; then the lines as of April 6 followed a line drawn
f•om Mun ter to Lippstadt to Brilon to Laa phe to ie~en and then aloM
the ieg River to the Rhine. Most of this line followed natural borders.
Ot the front protected by rivers and canals, the 31 I th Infantry Rel(iment
(78th Division) held a bridgehead across the Sieg River, through which
the 78th Division and 97th Divisivn would pass in the attack. The 8t'1
Division held a small bridgehead across the ieg at iegen, through which
the 8th Division and the 86th Division would p1 s. Jn the north thr
35th Division held a mall bridgehead across the Dortmund-Em5 'lnal
As the American units prepared for the offensive. the Germ1n force<
were not just sitting back waiting. On April 5, the Krauts made attempt
after attempt to break out of the pocket and rejoin what .remained of the
German Army further east. ome :Jf these attacks were in the south and
s,1me in the north, but wherever they were the units cal led upon to repul •e
them found it no easy task. Jn most instances the Germans would employ
everal companie of infantry with attached King Tiger tanks. A always,
the pesky 88 was handy. But to the credit of every American involved ,
it must be said that for every American casualty, there were ten ermans
killed.
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As we attempt to narrate the Battle of the Ruhr it is very difficult
to write of the entire operation simu ltaneously, as it must be remembered
that there were no less than 17 divisions involved in the engagement,
and they were advancing in every direction of the compass, all with a
common purpose-to knock out of the war as soon as possible all German
units trapped in the Ruhr. The writer feels somewhat like a baseball
announcer up in the press box with three major league games unfolding
in front of him at the same time, with hi s job to announce all three. So
for no reason other than continuity, we wi ll write of the Battle of the
Ruhr from here on, by following each main attack to its conclusion,
instead of jumping from Ninth Army to First Army to Fifteenth Army
and back again to Ninth Army in one breath. Therefore, we shall, for our
convenience on ly, divide the Ruhr Pocket campaign into four operations,
and treat each of them separately; although it must be constantly recalled
by the reader that all operations were closely connected and the general
attack was coordinated at all time .

CHAPTER 5
THE XVIII CORPS ATTACK FROM
THE SOUTH
As the offensive got under way on the morning of Apri l 6, the

XVIII Corps, under the command of Lt. Gen. Matthew R!dgeway,
faced the enemy on a front a long the genera l line of the Sieg River from
its mouth near Bonn to a sma ll dusty vi llage named chamedar (complete
with its community water pump and town crier), a few miles northwest
of Laasphe. The Airborne Corps had troops displaced along the corp~
front from west to east as fo llows:
(a) The 97th "Trident" Infantry Division, newly arrived afrer extensive
amphibious training, occupied the front from the mouth of the ieg at Bonn
all the way upstream to tromberg. All three regiments were abreast on the
line. The 3 11st Infantry (b6th Division) was temporarily attached to the
97th Division.
(b) The 78 th "Lightning" Divi ion, after almost a month of continuous
service in the Remagen Bridgehead, was on line with two regiments along the
ieg from Dattcnfel<l to Brachbach. One regiment was in corps reserve.
(c) The 8th Infantry Division was on line from Nieder chelden (south ol
Siegen) to chame<lar. All three regiments were on line. The 740 th Tank
Battalion was attached to the 8th Division .

( d) The 86rh "Black I lawk" lnfantrv O :vis:on was on the de'ense on the
right flank of the Airborne Corps, with two regiments dug-in in hill country
The 3tf 1st Infantry was att<tehed to the 97th Division, and one company of
the 740th Tank Battalion was attached to the 86th Division.
( e) The 13th Armored
reached the area.

Di~ision

was :m iy,ncd to rhe corps but had not yet

The countryside through which the A: rborne Corps would at tac!:
can best be desribed as "standing on end." The hi! Is were steep and
crowded, with the only pass w.1ys being dirt or rock r<nds which wended
their way throu1:h the canyons between the high hi lls. An occ1sional
lire break offered addition.ti room for mO\ ement. T h roughout the entire
area of advance, except in the .trea close to the Rhine, the firs were
thick and stood di~mal and drippinJ.:. The bodies of the firs be~in clore
to the ground so that each fir interlocks its body with another. At the
height of a man st.rnding, there was a so lid mass of green, but at the
height of a man crnwling, or stooped, there was room, and it was like
a green, low roofed rnve, and th rough this cave, moved the infantry
cold, wet and exhausted.
The XVIII Corp wa actually ,1n airborne corps, even though
there were no airborne troops in it at the time, but there were many time~
during the Battle of the Ruhr when the dou~hboys would wearily climb
h• the top of a htll and would ~in: their eye teeth for an airborne
Cflnveyance of some: type to lift them to the top of the next h; ll ·and
often they felt th.1t ther would never reach the top of the next hill.
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The corps attack was launched at 0500 hours on April 6 and made
substantial progress in the center. The 97th Division on the left and the
86th Division on the right maintained their defensive positions as the
veteran 8th and 78th Divisions kicked off the attack.
The 78th Division's 309th Infantry and 310th Infantry, each with
a battalion of the 31lth Infantry attached, made the initial amphibious
assault of the ieg River at the same time the 8th Division was crossing
further east. The 78th Division Engineers cleared the mine fields along
the river bank as the doughboys climbed into the plywood assault boats
and made way for the north bank of the Sieg River. The Battle of the
Ruhr was on. Tanks and TD 's were in position along the river bank
to lend fire support to the artillery units which were supporting the
assault landing. On the opposite bank of the Sieg the XVIII Corps faced
elements of four German divisions, identified as the 62nd, 59th, and
363rd Volksgrenad ier, and 11th Panzer Divisions. Later the crack Panzer
Lehr Division made its appearance facing the 8th and 86th Divisions.
The 78th Di vision made small gains in the bridgehead area during
the morning. About noon, prisoner of war interrogations revealed that
there were a number of American prisoners of war in a hospital at
Waldbrol, a few miles behind the German lines just north of Wissen.
Two battalions of the 309th Infantry diverted their attacks in the direction of Waldbrol, to attempt to free their fellow soldiers. Elements
ot Con:ipany , 309th Infantry, managed to reach the hospital and found
71 Americans ho pitalized, on ly one of whom could walk. The German
stil l offered determined resistance to the attack and the patrol from
Company C was forced to withdra\\. However Company K, 309th Infantry finally managed to knock out several se lf-propelled guns defending
the town and a patrol reached the hospita l and was able to evacuate
the 7 l wounded Americans under the cover of darkness.
Meanwhile, ,1 few miles to the right of the 78th Division bridgehead at Wisscn , the 8th InLrntry Divi ·ion jumped off with the 3rd
lLttalion, 28th Infantry, making the initial assault across the ieg.
Opposition in the 8th Divi ion area ranged from medium to heavy, al l
depending on the type of unit opposing them. If S troops were in the
area, opposition was Jetcrmined; if not, opposition was lighter.
During the.: afternoon, the 8th Divisi on captured the fairly large town
of l :rndteb~uck , where a counter-attack was crushed with the destruction
of one tiger tank and two other armored .'chicles. After a ?risk _ fire
fl nht Bi rkelbach fell and the dou•(hboys dug-in around the road 1unct1ons.
In consulting a map, a casua l observer may question why. _ in the
,,h Jnce of the First Army troop from the south, the 8th Dms1on and
the 86th Di' iswn leape<l so far out in front of _their unit~ operat!ng on
their flanks? Tt m;1y sec:m that they suceeded 111 advanong while the
units fighting on the left flank of the First Army front were dragging
their feet. This was not the ca c.
It '"ill be note<l th.it from Bonn north to the Ruhr River, there arc
numerous streams which Clow ea t and we t to a junction with the Rhine.
These riYer all ha Ye large dams and reservoirs on their headwaters. By
destroying these dam-, the Germans could have thrown any of these

Infantrymen arc here ecking shelter a a rifle quad just ahead i clearing a
road blo k defended by Panzer troops.

streams into flo d, with many American soldier being swe})t to a watery
grave. Therefore, upremc I !eadciuartcrs decided the sa est procedure
would be to have the 8th Division and 86th Division seize the head water of these rivers, as well a any dams and re ervoirs, before an
attempt was made to cro s the river down tream.
Therefore, the 13th Armored, 97th Division, and 78th Division in
e.tch in "tance was held up at ca h river until the 8th and 86th Divi ions
had cleared the headwater of the water hed.
On April 7, the full force f four di vi ion in the Airborne corp~
area wa on the move. The 97th Infantry Division (with the 34lst
Infantry of the 86th Divi ion attached) jumped off at 1230. The Trident
D1vi ion, which only recently had completed cxten ive amphibious training
in the tate for an expected commitment in the outhwe ·t Pacific, made
it fir t river a ault a success[ ul one when it e tabli hed a bridgehead
aero the ieg River we t of tromberg. By nightfall a bridgehead of
three miles in depth wa held by the 97th Divi ion. The d ughboy
er.trenched them elves in a defen c line and underwent a hectic night, as
numerous German patrols attempted to infiltrate the line to de troy the
bridge the engineers had built during the aftern on over the swift ief'
River.
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78rh Division Captures Freudenberg
. The 78th Division, i? its own bridgehead, spent most of the day
trying to capture the heavily defended town of Freudenberg, which was
a key communications center holding up the advance of both the 78th
and 8th Divisions. Under orders from the corps commander, the 310th
Infantry Regiment (78th Division) fought through extensive artillery
fire to capture the town. A total of 500 prisoners were taken in Freudenberg (a large number for a day's take at this stage of the war). Three
enemy counter-attacks were repulsed by the 78th Division during the
lnte afternoon.
The 8th Infantry Division found going very slow all day. Their
advance was held up by the determined opposition around Freudenberg
until that town was cleared by the 78th Division. After reeling briefly
from the blow of two heavy counter-attacks, which were repulsed with
some casualties, the 8th Division advanced some two miles to secure the
high ridges overlooking the Sieg River. One regiment captured Erndtebruk and Schameder and dug in for the night on the outskirts of Zinse.
Meanwhile, on the right flank of the XVIII Airborne Corps, the
86th Infantry Division went on the attack in a coordinated assault with
the 99th Infantry Division of the III Corps. (The 86th Division at firs~
found themselves engaged with the enemy with only one regiment on
line, as the 341st Infantry was still attached to the 97th Division and
assigned the mission of mopping up enemy resistance near Siegen. At
the same time, part of the 343rd Infantry was on a motorized mission
for the 8th Division near Haiger.) The 342nd Infantry advanced two
miles during the day along the right flank of the corps area and seized
the ridges overlooking th~ headwaters of the Hunden River. .The Hund~n
River flowed northward into the Lenne River which in turn ~111pti~d into
the Ruhr River near Hagen. This waterway, the Hunde.n anp Lenne
River , would serve as the boundry between XVIII and III Corps during
the remainder of the Ruhr operations.
The 86th Division did have one grand prize for tpe day, how~ver.
Early in the morning of the seventh, a patrol of the 342nd Infantry passed
behind enemy lines and captured the CG of the 326th Wehrmach Infantrv
Divi ion, Major General Koschner.
On April 8, the 97th Division continued to enlarge its bridg~head
in the mountainous terrain between Hennef and Blankenberg. The
3&7th Infantry (97th Division) was employed to exploit the bridgehead.
On the right flank of the 97th Division, the 386th Infantry captured
sc:veral high ridges south of Neunkirchen, and placed the division in
position to attack that town the following d~y. In the division. area,. the
322nd Engineer Battalion completed five bndges across the 1eg River.
Wald Bron. a large German factorv town. located on a stream bv
the same name, was the objective of the 78th Infantry Division on April
8. After capturing the towns of Freuden bent. Morsbach and Litchenberl!.
Genern.l Parker. CG of the 78th Division . assigned the 309th Infantrv
(78th Division) the ta k of capturing Wald Bron. As the 3 lOth Infantrv
(78th Di' ision) protected the flanks , the 309th Infantry · ~orf'1.erl th -:

38

THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR POCKET

ancient city and knocked out the enemy strong points in the nearby valley.
In the 8th Division area, the 28th Infantry (8th Division) advanced
10,000 yards and captured Wurdinghausen and Rinske. Northwest of
Siegen the 13th Infantry (8th Division) continued to mop up isolated
e;1emy strong points which had been passed in the attack on Siegen.
(On April 8, the 740th Tank Battalion arrived in the XVJII Corps area and
was attached jointly to the 8th Division and the 86th Division, and for the
remainder of the Ruhr campaign this battalion proved to be the workhorse of
the corps. The Tank Battalion was assigned to the two divisions to lead the
attack and to lend the necessary tank. support. The tankers were later commended by the commanders of both divisions for the yeoman service rendered
in the Ruhr.)

At dusk on April 8, the 342nd Infantry (86th Division) launched
a coordinated attack on the German railroad center of Hilchenbach. Three
rifle companies of the regiment swooped down out of the hills just at
dusk and caught the German garrison completely by surprise. After once
clearing the town, elements of the Panzer Lehr Division attempted to
reenter the town, and the 86th Division units in the city spent the remainder of the night repulsing counter-attacks.

Those Beloved "K" Rations
During most of the Ruhr campaign, the front line troops were fed
C or K rations. Our supply units did a very good job of bringing up our
rntions and rare wa the occasion when we missed our three rations a day,
although most of the time we had to carry an extra ration around as the
rifle companie often were ituated in isolated areas.
The "C" Ration unit usually consisted of a small can of beef stew, or
else pork and beans, which could be eaten either hot or cold, but tasted
like a wet dish rag either way. Then there was another can which contained a "Hard-tack" like biscuit or two, three pieces of " hri tmas"
candy, and two Raleighs. (They always said that Lucky trike Green had
gone to war. That may be true, but GI's in the ETO were certain it was
not this war, it wa Raleighs which had gone to war in this theatre.) One
of each can wa issued for each meal, and very little variety in diet was
po sible for 90 per cent of the time one would always end up with the
Beef Stew unit.
The " K" Ration was more compact, and ea ier to handle by the
combat soldier, as it would easily fit into a field-jacket pocket and it was
no problem at all for a foot-slogger to carry his entire day's ration with
him. The breakfast unit was called "Ham and Eggs, " or " Bacon and
Eggs. " Oh, well, they had to call it something, and it did beat .spam.
For dinner it was American cream cheese, and for the night meal it was
hash or stew; defending on whether it was dark when you ate, and
whether you couk see it or not. ome always said it ta led better in the
dark. With each meal there were the usual cracker , a small piece of candy,
and again two Raleighs. (Those who didn't moke had a saying, "Save
your Raleighs boys, France will rise again " - naturally looking forward
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to a 3-day pass back in France, and don't ever underestimate the barter
Talue of a cigarette in France.)
Then on rare occasions, and rare indeed, for the front soldier, was
the 10-in-1 rations, which were prepared to feed 10 men for one day, all
three meals. These rations contained practically all of the delicacies of
home, even down to sliced bacon and butter.
Then, also on rare occasions, the company kitchens would catch up
with the combat units and serve a hot meal. But this was very unusual
in the Ruhr, due to the rapid pace at which our forces were advancing.
Whenever the kitchens were brought forward and a hot supper, followed
by a hot breakfast, our doughboys were suspicious- they believed it to
be an unfailing sign of a big attack just ahead, and they were fattening
us for the kill.
When speaking of rations, there is one ration that you will never
find mentioned in a field manual, or taught in basic training. But any GI
who ever fought in Europe will never forget it. That is the "Liberated
Egg Rations." Yes, give a combat sold ier a brief respite from duty, say
25 or 30 minutes, and the chicken house is searched, the basement
cased, and every crock and pan in the kitchen upturned until the eggs
are found .
In the Ruhr, eggs were plentiful, and as soon as the Gl's went into
billet for the night, a fire was built and the eggs were frying. The writer
recalls, on one occasion in the Ruhr, a group of infantrymen moved into
billets and built a good fire on which to cook their eggs. The smoke
naturally caught the enemy's eye, and a heavy artillery barrage was pinpointed on the house in which they were billeted. All the men in the
platoon were lying in a prone po ition, flat on the floor, eating eggs,
while the rifleman pressed into duty as a cook continued to jump up and
turn over the eggs between shell bursts.
Another liberated ration pressed into service was venison. Whenever a company or battalion went in reserve, it was not unusual for a
nachine-gunner to level down on one of the small deer so often seen in
lhe hilly, wooded area of the Ruhr. When this happened the entire
company wou ld eat veni on steak, much in the style of Robin Hood.
A new division came under the direct control of the XVIII Airborne
orps on the morning of April 9, when the recently arrived 13th Armored
Division moved into the area just south of the 97th Divi ion area near
Sregburg. The l 3th Armored Di vi ion was im,mediately ordered to prepare to attack in a drive along the corps left flank adjacent to the Rhine.
On this day, all XVIII Corps unit met with success in driving the
enemy back toward the Ruhr, with slight advances being recorded on the
It ft flank of the corps area, and large gains being registered by the 8th
Division and the 86th Division on the right flank. Enemy resistance was
heavy around all roads and town , with numerous flak concentration~
being leveled against the doughboys as they advanced over the steep
hill .
The 97th Divi ion advanced two miles along the right flank of the
corps area, with all three infantry regiments abreast. The 303rd Infantry
(97lh Divi ion) cleared about half of Sieburg, while the 387th and

Near Olpe, elements of the 8th Division are shown adYancing benearh a
bombed railroad bridge. Minutes after this photo was taken, portions of the
railroad crack shown fell, in;uring some doughboys.
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386th Infantries (97th Di vision) from left to right pushed the front
forward to a line running from Siegburg to Neunkirchen to Harscheid.
With all three regiments attacking abreast (in order from left to
r:ght, 309-311-310) the 78th Division gained three miles to extend its
front on a line from Numbrecht to Oberwiehl thense through Erdingen
t rJ Buschgrund, just above Freudenburg, the hospital town captured two
days before. The 78th Division during the day was forced to pull two
bJttalions of combat troops out of front line duty to send them 15 miles
tc the rear to guard food and supplies which were being looted by
liberated slave laborers, many of whom were starving to death.
The 8th Division registered the big gains of the day when two
rc.:giments registered advances of approximately nine miles to capture
Kreutzel, Littfeld, and the maior industrial city of Olpe.
The 740th Tank Battalion made a ten mile flanking attack to seize
and clear the tate Forest of iegen , where numerous German Ack-Ack
units were displaced.
The 86th Division continued on the move in keeping with theadvancrs of other XVIII Corps units on April 9, advancing some four
miles to capture the town of Altenhunden , on the banks of the Hunden
River at its confluence with the Lenne River.
(Enemy units known to be opposing the advance of the XVIII Airborne
Corps ac this time were: 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, 12th Yolks Grenadier
Division, 9th Panzer Division , 272nd Infantry Division, 253rd Infantry Division, 340th Infantry Division, 226th Infantry Division, 12th Infantry Division,
and the 150th Panzer Lehr Division. However, all of the units were known to
be understrengthed. )

13th Armored Division is Committed to Action
On the morning of April 10, the XVIII Corps committed the 13th
Armored Division to action for the first time, and the tankers received
their " bapti m of lire" in a sector of the front straddling the Autobahn
which parallel the Rhine River. The 13th Armored Division area was on
the extreme left fl1nk of the corps and army area, running generally from
the Rhine eastward for some eight miles. The 97th Division , which
had been maintaining this section of the front, gently idestepped east
to more efficiently cover the large front to which it was assigned.
The 13th Armored Division passed through the 97th Division
bridgehead near Hennef and after skirting iegburg, which was sti ll under
siege by the 303rd Infantry (97th Di vision) attacked along the Autobahn
and reached Lohmar by nightfall.
The 97th Di vision continued to mop-up the determined resistance
in iegburg, where fanatical S troops were lighting to the death. The
303rd Infantry (97th Division) , and the 34lst Infantry (86th Division) .
which was attached to the 97th Division at the time, was used for this
purpose. Meanwhile the remainder of the 97th Division made gains of
four miles to reach a point in the hills southwest of Gummersbach.
In the 78th Division area, the advance wa very rapid, as a decided
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decline in resistance was noteJ.
taken by telephone.

In one instance a town was actually

"On April 10, a doughboy picked up a German telephone receiver, and he
would hear rhe German equivalent of "Number, please?" A German 'peaking soldier would gee the next town on the phone and aslc for the Burgermei3ter
or local commander and inform him char the American3 had his town next on
rhe list if he did not surrender. This method proved very elfecrive and soon
whire sheers would be flying fwm all the window3.
Each regiment was also using a rank equipped with a public address system.
As the tank approached a town the loudspeaker would blare our:
"Stop fighting . . Surrender . .. You will be created as Prisoners of War
under rhe Geneva Convention by the Americans." If chis warning did not
prove effective rhe Americans had another more effective overture to surrender
- an artillery barrage."
- From"Lighming, The History of the 78rh Infantry Division."
--Copyright 1917, by Infantry Journal, Inc., (now Combat
Forces Press, an activity of the Association of the U. S. Army)
and reproduced by permission.

The 8th Division, which had captured Olpe the previous day, conl;nued to pace the attack rrnd wa · severa l miles out in front of al l other
First Army units. Elements of the 8th Division leaped all the way north

Throughout Germany our infantrymen continued to move forward . The e
doughboy5 arc \hown advancing rhru a wooded area which had only reet·ntly
been bombed.
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to Minerzhagen and K ierspe. At 1100, on Apri l 10, the artillery forward
observers spotted a huge Gerr:ian horse-drawn convoy p1ssing th rough
the congested vall ey at the cross roads town of Kierspe. At once all the
arti ll ery batteries for miles around were turned against this convoy, and
within m ~ nutes the entire co 'uf:1n was rel:igated to a m1ss of ruin. For
over two miles, there was noth ing left but burn ing wreckage and
mangled horse me1t, with hundreds of wounded and dead Gerf!1ans
amidst th is scene of de:;truction. What few men and horses that had
managed to escape were in such a dazed condition, that they too weremedica l c1ses. The scene of utter destrucrion at Kierspe was probably
not eqmlled anywhere else in the European War.
The 8th Divi ~ ion w1s on li ne w;th the 28th Infantry on the right
nnd the 12lst Infantry on the left. The 13th Infantry was in re~erve.
The 8th Division line at the close of the day was in a loop just above
Kierspe.
The 86th Divis;on , on the XVTTI Airborne Corp:; right fhnk, ran
up a~ainst one of the heavily fort ;f.ed positions for •vhich the Ruhr
was famous, and on the boundary between the 86th Division area and
the area of the 99th Division, one of the most bruta l battles of the Ruhr
campaign took place.
The Third Battalion, 342nd Infantry, kicked off in an attack toward the
Brugg River at 0800. The battle order handed to the Battalion Commander
called for the battalion to advance with all three companies abreast through
dense forest for about 8 miles, ro take the communications centers of Bonzel
and Grevenbruk, by surprise from the flank. The fir forest in this area was
almost impassable and a heavy fog limited visibility to practically zero. All
during the morning the infantrymen slowly worked their way through the
forest, and over several ranges of steep hills, meeting only scattered opposition
from isolated MG nests.
Abou r noon, as the companies approoched the Bonzel road junction, Co. L
342nd Infantry captured a man and woman observation teafn dressed in
civilian clothes but carrying a field radio in a suit case. Two Russ:an -slave
laborers were also found wandering in the woods. Several hundred yards
further, as Co. I was coming down the forward slope of a hill approach'.ng
Bonzel, all Hell broke loose. Hidden in the dense undergrowth at the road
junaion was a regular fortre s, consisting of large numbers of Anti-Aircraft
guns and AA Arcillcry. These weapons were turned down and were fired at
point blank range at the unwary Black Hawks advancing over the brow of the
hill.
A platoon, led by Lt. Forrest Myers, was in the vanguard of the I Co. advance and the first to feel the blow when the Kraut installation opened up.
With practica lly no cover on the hillside, the doughboys were at the mercy
of God alone, as their position was raked by lire from the Ack Ack guns
below. Out of contact with Regiment and even the rest of their battalion
nearby, Co. 1 suffered extremely heavy casualties within the next hour and was
pinned down for three hours. When the ack ack batteries first opened up,
Pfc. Robert econ, Fairfield , onn., was the nearest ro the enemy. He immediately opened up lire with his BAR and kept up continuous lire in covering his
platoon which was arrempting to reorganize. Pfc. econ was killed in action
as was Pfc. George Sczomak, Detroit, Michigan, who continued to advance on
the enemy position armed only with a rifle until he fell mortally wounded.
With only ten members of his platoon left after the initial attack, T / Sgt. Leslie
I licks, Cuc Bank, Montana, reorganized the remainin,it members of the unit and
counterattacked the Jerry In the meantime, Pfc. Charles Murphy, Atlanta, Ga. ,
Lt. Myers, and Pfc. Junior Robin son, ot Quincon, Okla., managed to reach a
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building ar rhe edge of Bonzel from where they held on bravely rhrough
several concentrated arcacks by German panzer units. They were lacer joined
by 10 ocher members of rhcir platoon.
Casualties in Co. I reached the amazing coca] of almosr 50 per cent including rhe wounded and missing by rhree o'clock. Nearby Co. K and Co. L were
carching more of rhe same from the flak barteries. K Company, advancing on
Bonzel from the opposite direcrion, ran righr into a King Tiger rank deployed
along the road at rhe outskirts of cown. A direct hit by a bazooka team
descroyed this obstacle.
Numerous MG nests were deployed by the Germans surrounding rhe Flak
bacceries. Pfc. Lindy M. Shambaugh of Magnolia, W. Va., singlehandedly
attacked one MG nesr and destroyed ir with a hand grenade. Pfc. Richard
Mapes also distinguished himself by advancing in front of his company and
setring up a MG co prorecr his units flank .
Co. L, 342nd Infantry was advancing on Donze! from rhe lefr Rank, when
rhe batceries in the valley below opened fire on Item Company. As the flak
guns swirched rheir field of lire toward L o., T /Sgt. Earl L. Roat, Cincinnati,
Ohio, deployed his platoon and steadily crepe to within 30 yards of the enemy,
fixed bayoner and commenced to fire as he advanced ahead of his platoon. gt.
Roat was killed by an enemy grenade as he jumped inro a Jerry trench , but
his gallantry inspired his platoon into over running the posirion. The lead
scour for Co. Lin rhe advance was Pfc. Robert C. Hurley, Lutherville, Maryland,
who susramed a head wound in the initial encounter. Pfc. Ilurley refused co
be evacuated or even submit co medical treatmenr and continued to advance as
lead scour until the objective was reached.
Meanwhile o. 1, on the ease hill facing the town, was split in half by a
German counter arrack. One half of the company joined Lt. Myers in a small
group of buildings at rhe edge of mwn, where they held our behind the enemy
lines until counter atracking Co. K reached them late in rhe day. The other
half of Co. I wirhdrew over the crest of the hi II where it was reorganized by
Lt. Rodney Bur.l(in, 1st gt. Bill ' ralford, Oxford, Nebr., and gr. R . L. Apple
gate, while Pfc. Everette Berry, company radio operaror, tried vainly t<> esrablish radio contact.
Many of the casualcies suffered by the 3rd Battalion, 342nd In fantry were
lying our in no·man's land.
haplain Gerald T . Krohn, upon learning this ar
Regimental lleadquarcers, volunteered as a lirter bearer and made several trips
inro unfriendly territory ro evacuate the wounded. While creating some of
rhe casualties, four medical aid men were capcured by a Kraut patrol , bur they
were rek-ased rhe following day by the 99rh Division after 24 hours held as
prisoner .
The German positions finally were eliminated ar 1700 when air support
arrived and a severe poundin1: by all four of the artillery batcerie eliminated
this barrier, once and for all. The 3rd Battalion, 3tl2 nd Infanrry came out of
the eng.igemeni on April I 0 badly mauled, ;tnd was withdrawn from the line
at 2000 and relieved by rhe I t Battalion, 34 3rd. The bartered outlir was then
pulled back ro Altenhunden where ir regrouped and was brought back ro
combat trcngrh by a large number of replacements ju~t arrived from various
IRTC's back in rhe srates.
-Reprinred from "Black llawks Over The Danube - The History of che 86th Infantry Division ," copyrighr 19~4 .

Despite the set back suffered by this battalion, the 86th Division
unit captured numerous towns during the day, including Bilstein and
'revenbruk, and forced a crossing of the Bigge Ri,·er, which would
~ u ed the next day in an assault on Attendorn.
I olated enemy strongpoint , often centered around an anti-aircraft
emplacement, reinforced by two or three armored vehicles and a company
of infantry, provided the m.1jor oppo ition to the advance of the XVIII
(orps on April 11.
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0~ .0e l e~t flank, the 13th. Armored Division passed through the
97th D1v1s10n Imes and attacked in a bold move which carried the tankers
tc' within sight of the large bend of the Rhine just upstre:u:1 from
ologne. With the huge smokestacks of the Ford plant, and the towers
of the Cologne Cathedral to serve as a cor.:p1ss the 13th Armored Di vision
registered gains of some 7,000 yards during the d:ty.
The 97th Division, which had side- tepped to the right to make
room for the 13th Armored, advanced their forward regiments to the
banks of the A~gei; River. Some Trident Division units were engaged
I'-, mopping up behind the advance of the 13th Armored Division alonp
the banks of the Rhine.
A reservoir on the headwaters of the Agger River was the objective
of the 78th Division during the day, and by 1600, the 3 lOth Infantry
(78th Division) held the city of Dumming as well as its dam. The
31 lth Infantry in the meantime captured the town of Gummersbach.
The importance of the siezure or the dams on the headwaters of
the Agger River should not be underestimated. These reservoirs controlled the entire front along the left flank of the corps area, for if the
enemy were to open the gates, the entire lower Agger valley could be
flooded, and make the rosition of any American troops north of the river
untenable. Once the dams were captured, the 78th Di vision, 97th Division.
and 13th Armored Division could attack across the river and keep pace
v•ith the remainder of the XVIII Corps.
In the 8th Di vision sector of the front, spearhead in~ infantrymen of
the 28th Regiment captured intact the power dam at Barse Talsp.
However, the 13th Infantry found the going much tougher just north
of Kier pe, and a determined fight took place there the biggest part
of the day.
The 31 lth Infantry (78th Division), reinforced by the 78rh Division
avalry Troop, captured the dam. The recon troop was the first to
reach the dam, and in searchin g for demolitions, one GI opened a door
which appeared to lead to the inspection area below the dam, and out
ru hed 14 fully armed Germans, but all were in a surrenderin~ not;on.
The nearby ciry ()f Gummersbach had a pre-war population of over 20,000.
On entering rhc city square, a huge sign had been crudely painted and left
Aying as a banner across the plaza which read: "We always haced Hitler, s:>
glad you come ... Nix azi." In a German bank facing che Plaza, the Milicarv
Government unit of rhe 78th Division seized a vault containing over 50
million marks. This wa~ becoming an old story, chis " ix Nad' scuff, and
che Gl's were not fooled by suth protestation.; of innocence

At nearby L ope, an entire Gernnn g:urison surrendered to the
309th In fantry (78th Di\ision) in a formal ceremony. The comm111der
lined hi entire unit up in parade formations and with tears in his eyes
made a brief but touching farewell speech, .md then turned and surrendered to the American commander.
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Attendorn Falls co the 86th Division
On the right flank of the corps front, the 86th Di vision doug hboys
v. ho forced a crossing of the Bigge Ri ve r the prev ious day, hit the
Germans hard from the flanks and siezed the city of Attendorn. Company
A, 342nd In fantry ( 86th Di vision ) was su bjected to an hour of house
to house and room to room lighting before the fa nat ical
garrisor.
was anni hil ated.
In Attendorn was located a large slave labor camp, one of the largest
in the Ruhr. The inmates of this camp were forced to work 18 hou rs
a day in the nearby mines, and we re driven and beaten to their work
by a stearn German task-master. When the 86th Di vision doughboys
freed th is camp, the inmate cornered the former camp commandant
in a building and were intent on hanging him then and there. However,
a patrol from the 86th Di vision managed to race him out of h i barricaded
bui ldi ng and turn him over to the Military Government for trial as a
war criminal.
As our infantrymen overran the PW and slave labor camps, more
and more we were ab le to realize the type of enemy we were facing.
Here was a suppo ed ly civ ili zed nation , whose government and citizens
h,1d ubjected people of neighboring nation , and d ifferent beliefs, to the
rPost inhuman and cruel treatment imag inable.
As we entered these concentration camps, we were ab le to <·ee
with our own eyes the bake ovens, where hundreds of thou ands of Jews
Poles, French, Rus ians, lavs and even American were murdered in
co ld blood. fn the e camps the
wou ld often burn their prisone rs a li ve.
At one camp in the Ruhr our infantrymen uncovered a slave labor camr
where political prisoner were housed in low, ill -heated buildings with
200 starved individuals to a room. Wooden she lve· lin ed the wall s.
These she lves were about live feet deep and three feet apart. Timbers
were spaced fiye feet apart to divide these shelves into compartments.
The final compartment was about five feet wide, five feet long and two
to three feet high .
In each of these compartments the Kraut beast assigned six men
•ometimes seven. Just imagine in your mind seYen men forced to live
in a space 5'x5'x3'; however, when a person has been starved and
is no bigger around the waist than the top portion of a baseball bat,
that person does not require muth room.
Our force, as they athanced through the Ruhr, saw hundres upon
hundreds of these poor wretched souls as they freed them from captivity.
Many of them wore the ·· tar of D.nid " on their striped uniform, others
jl!st a German \ersion of the letter " P", but one and all, they had been
exposed to the mo t mhuman treatment possible.
The German proved himself to be " A butcher by nature, a butcher
by trade."
As our own American boys were fr(·c:d from the: numerous P\'V'
caJ;es 111 the Ruhr, they likewise to ld a story of mistreatment at the hands
or the Hun .

At Attendorn rbe 86th Division rescued the former Commandant of a slave
labor camp just as the inmates of his camp were preparing to lynch him. He
was lacer tried and convicted of war crimes and received a long prison sentcn:·c.
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Many of the Americans who had been captured by the Germans
the Battle of the Bulge were liberated in the Ruhr. Time and time
again they told of their treatment while prisoners of the Germans. They
told of being forced to walk for miles without food or water. One GI
who had been taken prisoner in December 1944, was loaded on a freight
car with 60 other PW's and taken for a 4 day-200 mile trip to Upper
ilesta. They were given no food nor water for the trip. Their overcoats,
blankets, field jackets and shoes were taken away from them. With the
temperature near the zero mark, they were forced to ride for four days
like this. This prisoner and his companion were forced to lick the
ice on the hinges of the box-car door for water. As there were no
an itation facilities whatsoever in the car, the prisoners were forced to
use a small corner of the car for that purpose. Then the German guards
would enter the car and would hit the prisoners with their rifle butt
and call them "dirty American wine''.
Many of the American prisoners liberated in the Ruhr Pocket were
wounded and badly in need of medical attention. The prisoners told
row our own medics had their aid kits taken away from them and were
refused supplies with which to treat their fellow prisoners. Many of the
American relea ·ed in the Ruhr weighed on ly 60 and 70 pounds where
once they had been well built men of 170 and 190 pounds.
cenes such as these mentioned above, left a bad taste in the front
lme soldiers mouth, and little pity cou ld be expected by any German who
had the gall to complain of small , trivial inconvenience: .
111

Roosevelt Die . . . . Lucien chied Fall

April 12, 1945, was the clay our beloved President, Franklin D .
Roosevelt, died at his retreat near Warm prings, Georgia, but to the
infantryman on tht front line, it w,1s just another day of misery. When
lhe word reached the front lines, one battalion of the 86th Division ,
was within minute of jumping off in a Task Force to attack the largest
city thus far encountered in the Ruhr, the industrial city of Ludenscheid.
Named Task Force Pope, the 3rd Battalion, 342nd Infantry (8<$th
Division) assembled for early chow at Attendorn and Brigadier General
Van \'V'hitc Pope, who commanded the Task Force bearing h i~, name,
briefed the men on their task while they ate.
Ac 0530 General Pope radioed co General Melasky chac che Task Force
had just passed chrou~h chc lirsc of a series of road blocks known co be sec up
on the road co Ludenscheid . A handful of Germans defended che road hlock
buc our accacheJ TD's quickly knocked chem ouc of che war. As che Task
Force advanced, che .B 2nd FA and 91 lch l·A, which were given direct sup
port, kept a barra.~e fallin. in front of the troops which was controlled by for
ward observers. Black I T.twk infantrymen passed many dead and wounded
Germans lining the road, who had felt the effecc of our artillery
Ac 1100 the infantrymen reached the oucskirrs of Ludenscheid, which lay
arnund a hiKh hill from the present po\ition of the Task Force. General Pope
halted tht: column and deployed the chree rifle comp.inies in a direu .mack
c ~ ward the City
Co. K and Co. L were ro accack alon,i: the ma 'n road into
rown while o. 1 wa~ to go over chc wooded hill .ind ,i:ive che companies .ipprcalhiny up the road direct lire upporr .
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A large faccory was situated at the near end of cown and as soon as the Task
Force started around the end of the hill the enemy turned every thing he had
loose on the doughboys. Co. K suffered heavy casualties but managed to continue co advance into the face of the enemy. After a half hour advance units of
Cos. K and L were cleaning up the pockets of resistance within the faaory site.
It developed that numerous Russian slave laborers were working in this factory,
and one of them braved the German MG bullets to pass out dry and warm
socks, which were scored in the warehouse, ro the Black Hawk troops. Co. K
still mer heavy resistance but Co. L, which was now entering the buildings along
rhe north side of rhe town, found themselves behind rhe enemy, and succeeded
in knocking out several 88 crews.
Meanwhile Co. I, advancing over the wooded hill on the left flank of rhe
Task Force, ran into a hotbed of MG nests on the hill overlooking the town.
Pfc. Cleo Parsons, Quanah, Texas, wirh utter disregard for his own safety, left
protective cover and single-handedly artacked a MG nest which had his company
pinned down and neutralized the position. Although wounded in the fray, he
remained with his company and continued to spark its advance. Meantime a
few yards away, Lt. John F. Seaton, in attacking another enemy position, fell
mortally wounded when struck by an enemy shell.
During the height of the battle, General Pope received rhe admiration of
all of his men by personally leading rhe rifle companies through the various
phases of rhe engagement. Ar 1645, after an extended negotiation, the city
finally was subdued by the superior Black Hawk forces and several hundred
PW's were captured, including a detachment of S troops, which provided plenty of souvenirs for those inclined toward them. The 3rd Bn., 342nd Inf. then
mopped up everal points of resistance within the city and set up a defense
1inc for the night.
Meanwhile the 343rd Infantry, which was on the offensive east of Ludencheid, formed a Task Force whose mission it was to swing north and rake the
high ground south of Osterich. This Task Force was composed of the 3rd Bn.,
343rd Inf., and elements of the 740rh Tank Bn., and 644rh TD Bn. Upon reach ing the cown of Huinghausen, forward elemtnts of the Task Force were pinned
down by artillery and 20mm flak . Upon reconnaissance it was discovered that
the enemy held all of the dominating ground and movement was impossible.
For three hours the 3rd Bn., 343rd Inf. was pinned down with any sort of
defense impossible due to che intensity of the fire from the flak guns. After
another cwo hours of pounding the Gtrman positions with heavy artillery from
the 91 lch FA Bn., the rifle companies were able co advance and late in che
afternoon Huinghausen fell co the Battalion and over 1,000 prisoners were
taken by the force.
-Reprinted from ""Black I Iawks Over The Danube - The Hiscory of the 86rh Infantry Division," copyright 1954.

The 8th Division advanced from 8 to 10 miles over the entire width
of it front on April 12, and its lines now ran through the towns of
Krcuzbcrg and l:hringhausen. The 8th Division, moving right up the
center corridor of the First Army advance, was setting the pace for the
re:st of the divisions in the campaign.
In the sector assigned to the 78th Division, the 309th Infantry (78th
Division) ran into its stiffest b:tttle of the Pocket. Advancing along the
left flank of the di' ision sector, the 309th Infantry had been in contact
with many German units pushing into the area by. the advan~e of frie~dly
American forces further south. Trapped, these isolated units sometimes
fought desperately before being subdued .
'" Almost on che boundary separating the two divisions (the 78th Division and
che 9 7ch Division ) wa tht town of Drabenderhohe. The 1st Battalion, 309ch
Infantry cur che road just south of cown and then swung west co meet the 97th
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Division men. Suddenly fire opened up on the men frcm directly ahead.
Enemy infantry was supported by 88's and AA guns. There, parrially camouflaged, was a German Ordnance dump, converted hastily into a fort. The men
worked to overcome this strong point. As darkness fell, the defenders finally
gave w;;und and slipped across the Agger River. Res:scance ended, the 1st
t3attaLon, 309th Infantry, reorganized and marched four hours to catch up with
the remainder of their regiment."
-From "Lightning, The History of the 78t b Infantry Division."
--Copyright 19'i7, by Infantry Journal, Inc., (now Combat
l'orces Press, an activity of rhe Association of the U. S. Army )
and reproduced by permission.

On the left lhn~ of the co:p:; arc:1, the I 3th Armored Division wa-:
advancing through he 97th Di,· :s;on arc::i and was prep:iring to spring
:i tr:ip w:tbin a tr.:ip, .1s tl:c over ..I l plans called for the 13th An:1ored
Divis 'on to le:ip out in front of the other units and then swi ng east to
tr:tp enemy units in front of the 78th Division. But an unexpected
~mount of opposition held the proposed p:ncer 1:1ovement b:lCk, and the
plan was calfed off. Then the 97th Division, beside its mission of
1: 1opp=ng up in the rear of the 13th Armored Division, was forced to
again attack in coordinJtion with the tankers.
Historians may never record the fact, but it is very likely that the
units of the XVTII Airborne Corps were the first American outfits to
fight the Koreans and they did it almost live years before other Americans
forces werl cal led on to ti ((ht in North Korea.
At one time durin 1~ the B ttt le of the Ruhr Pocket, American infantrymen of the XVTif Airborne Corps took a flak posiiion by storm, and
c1pture<l over I 00 Koreans who wc:re lighting as part of the German
Army. It seems that Koreans h.1d at one time been in the Ru ssian Army
and captured by the Germans at talingrad. The Germans recruited
them into their army and assigned them to anti-aircraft units. It was
in this manner that they were captured by the Americans.
Koreans were not the only 1wn German nationality encountered
i:i the Ruhr Porket. An entire regiment of horse cavalry of the J Tung.uian
Army was met and defeated nc:ar Olpe in the 8th Di' ision area. It must
be stated howe\'er, that the Hungarian troops were well trained and even
in surrender ne,·er broke mnks.
On April I .) , the enemy m:ide a bel,tted attempt lo ward off disaster
hy unleashing Se\·er.d violent counter-att.1cks against the xvrn Corps.
But these attacks were just like a dying mrn's last breath.
Despite these evident signs of increased determination to resist, the
XVIII Airborne Corps registered large gains for the day.
As the 86th Division was dearing Ludenscheid, the 31 Ist Infantry
( 86th Di' is ion) which had been returned to control of the Black Hawk
Division CG after its attachment to the 97th Division in mopping up
1egen, attacked along the main road net leading into I fagen . The advance
of the 34lst Inf.mtr}· continued without a hitch until it reached the
Hagen suburb of Priorie.
At Prioric the R6th Division ran into one of the well esrahl1shed flak emolate·
ments which were scattered throu,i:hout the Ruhr, such as at Bon1el and icpcn.
The entire regiment ( 31 lsr) was pinned down fc.r ;t lengthy peri0<I and
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suffered many casualties. The regimenr finally managed to break the back bone
of the enemy's attack and by 1800 the enemy troops in the area were routed.

The 86th Division spearhead then started to advance again and by
dark of April 13 were drawing up on the outskirts of Hagen, the huge
German industrial center, where the 34lst Infantry (86th Divisi on)
dug- in for the night in a circular perimeter defense. Meanwhile, the
343rd Infantry (a l ~o 86th Division) were c!osing in along the Lenne
River the en ti re distance from Ple~tcnberg to near its confluence with
the Ruhr River.
Meanwhile, in the center of the corps sector, the 8th Di vision
advanced 8 miles led by the 13th Infantry (8th Division), and reached the
corps " stop line" near Wilsse, which was on ly 2,000 yards from the
Ruhr. On the left, the 28th Infantry (8th Division) captured RadevormWald and Schwelm. In a tunnel near Wuppertal, the 8th Division
captured two railroad gun batteries, three carloads of ammunition and
two locomotives with steam up. In the attack on Schwelm, the 740th
Tank Battalion, attached to the 8th Division, knocked out a Mark VI
tank with direct lire from one of the lighter American tanks .
It was on April 13 that the 78th Di vision captured its first
general officer of the war. He forma lly surrendered in the town of Lindlar,
where some 1,212 prisoners were taken, the most captured by the 78th
Division in any one day since they entered the lines back in Belgium.
On the corps left flank the 97th Division and the 13th Armored
Division advanced to the east approaches of the demo lished Cologne
Bridge and by nightfall held a line running through Berg Gladbach .
These two divisions we.re operating in close contact with each other in
an attempt to bring the left flank of the corps area up even with the
ccn ter area.

The Pocket is Split
April 14 was a bii~ day in the Ruhr Pocket, for on that afternMP
elements of the 86th Division and the 8th Division sp li t the pocket in
two near Hagen, when contact was made with the 75th Division which
was occupying the north bank of the Ruhr near Wetter.
As the pocket was split in two many enemy units surrendered en
11;asse when they re'llized the hopelessness of their sitll'ltion.
On the right flank of the corp the 86th Division clearecl Hagen
a11d advanced an additional 3,000 yards to fecure the south bank of the
Ruhr River from Latmathe, at the mouth of the Lenne, all the way downstream to Hagen .
The 8th Di vi ion sent its 13th Infan try Regiment into a coordinated
attack with the 86th Division and the first link-up between the First Army
and Ninth Army units lighting in the Ruhr was made at 1800 hours.
The 8th Divi ion was now lightin~ in the heavily built up industrial
areas and one industry after another fell to the three regiment~. Enemv
re i tance increased greatly as the opposition was being forced between
our opposin~ forces.
umerous self-propelled guns and panzerfausts
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A tank crew eeks shelter in a narrow German street in repulsing a heavy
German air attack in the Ruhr.

·lowed the advance. Over 2,000 prisoners were taken by the 8th Division
on this date.
At 0630 on the morning of April 14 the 78th Division jumped off
i:, an attack on Lennep and \'V'uppertal. The rifle company leading the
attack passed through Lennep without meeting any opposition. After
passin,g through the town , which was a few miles south of Wuppertal,
oppo ition increased and the Lightning Division advance was slowed to
;1 crawl. Oppo ition was furnished by the crack 9th Panzer Division.
Wuppertal was the largest city in the whole area. From miles around
one could see the tall smoke ~tacks of its silk, cotton, paper, machinery
arid chemical factories. The only mono-rail tramway in the world was
situated there. The population totaled some 400,000, nearly as large as
Cincinnati . Five miles to the south was the sister city of Remscheid, with
.1 population of ome 100,000.
By late afternoon of April 14, the 8th Division, 78th Division, 97th
Division and the 13th Armored Divi ion were all drawing up around the
city and a late of seige was declared by the German forces commander.
The American units moved into position for an attack on the city during
the night.
The morning of April 15, 1945 dawned as a bright day, not only
i1i the skie above, but also for the fortunes of the American troops
engaged in the Ruhr Pocket. As our forces shoved off into the offensive,
we found the following situation facing the troops of the XVIII Airborne
Corps in the Ruhr.
The XVIII Airborne .orps and the XIX Corps of the Ninth Army
had linked in the center of the Ruhr, a few miles northwest of Ha~en,
rnttin,g the Ruhr Pocket into two mailer pockets. The union between
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A long column of war prisoners, all captured in the Ruhr, arc walked ro the
rear past a burned out Germ a n truck. As the Ruhr Pocket battle progressed,
thi s became a frequent scene, as more and more of the enemy surrendered.

the two armies now strctchcd some 25 miles along the Ruhr Ri ver
from near ! lagcn westward through Esborn. Meanwhile, other Gis of
the Airborne Corps were facing thc enomy on a genera l line drawn from
I faJ.ien, 1ust south of \'V'upperta l and Rernscheid to L<:v erkusen, on th<.
Rhine just north of Co logne:. A considcrab le pocket of azis st ill were
corn<:rcd in th<: Duisberg-Cologne- J lagen trianJ.ile but the bulk of th<:
cnemy in the: area of the XVllT Corps had been defeated. The units of
the Airborne orps (as of 0600, April 15) were engaged as follows:
The 86th Infantry Division, which had advanced to the Ruhr tht previous day,
was bu y mopping up ise>lated enemy strnng points which had been bypassed in
che rapid advance. The 3tl I sc In fantry was on the left near ll agen, the 3-12nd
Infantry cleared the west bank of thc Lenne near btmachc, and the 3-i3rd In
fancry mil held a line position, and were meeting dctermincd small arms fire
along the right flank of the corps.
'
The 8th Infantry Division had completed its original mission of splitting the
pocket in two, and as the enemy still was stubbornly defending the triangle in
front of the ' 8th Division and 9~'.h Division, ic was de<ided to have the entire
8rh Div ision swing around and attad in a IS de.l!ree angle, and attempt to
surprise the enemy with a llankini:. movement to the rear of the German lines.
The 7-10th Tank Battalion was attached to the 8th Division to 1upport rhi~

54

THE BATTLE OF THE RUHR POCKJlT

mission.
The 78th Division, fighting with all three regiments abreast, advanced eight
miles ro the immediate suburbs of Wuppercal and Solingen. The baccle co
capture Wuppertal was under way.
The 97ch Infantry Division attacked in che direction of Wuppertal also and
severed the railway line from Neukirchen co Burscheid. The 97ch Division
was ordered co flank Wuppercal on the left and co attempt to meet with the Sch
Division further north.
The 13th Armored Division advanced Combat Command R along che ease
bank of the Rhine for a distance of some three miles to the vicinity of leverkusen, which was directly across the Rhine from Cologne.

As the XVIII Corps prepared to complete its job in the Ruhr, we
will note that there were two big drives contemplated which would clear
the small pocket of troops then surrounded in the area. One called for
the three divisions on the left flank of the corps (namely the 78th, 97th
and 13th Armored) to continue to attack to the north while the other
called for the 8th Division to swing to the west and strike the German
troops from the rear.
While elements of the 97th Division were attacking Wuppertal,
other combat units of the division captured olingen, another huge Ruhr
industrial city.
Wuppertal was seized by the 78th Division, and the western edge
of the pocket was closed considerably for the day. Meanwhile, the 8th
Infantry Division, which had been ordered to swing west, had advanced
svme ten miles in the enemy's rear. By April 17, the Battle of the Ruhr
was over as far as the infantry was concerned: from this time on it was
a problem belonging to Military Go,ernmcnt.

CHAPTER 6
THE III CORPS ATTACKS FROM
THE SOUTHEAST
As the XVIII Corps attacked on the left flank of the First Army
area in the southern arc surrounding the Ruhr, the III Corps, under
command of Major Genera] Van Fleet, launched 11n attack in close
coordination which wou ld in a brief period of ten days result in the
complete destruction of all enemy forces in the Ruhr.
The III Corps was forced to fight in the most difficult terrain of any
are1 in the Ruhr, if not of al I Europe. The countryside was extremely
hilly and very wooded, which made it more than easy for sniper and
sharpshooters to do their deadly mission.
As this period of operations got under way on April 6, the III Corp
had troops engaged as follows:
(a) The 99th '"Checkerboard" Division held a front line position on the left
flank of che III Corps area and were attacking in a position from chamedar co
Schmallenberg. The 99ch Division was also to maintain contact with the 86ch
Division on their left.
(b) 7th Armored Division was co advance on a narrow front through heavy,
dense woods until contact was made wich Ninth Army. Two regiments were
on line.
( c) The veteran 9th Jnfancry Division was advancing on a front running from
Oberkirchen co Brilon. The 9ch Division was co press the attack on the right
flank of the corps area until che 5th Division was in position co relieve the 9th
Infantry Division. The 9th Division was also co protect the right /lank of all
infantry units lighting in the Ruhr.

The III orps mission was to attack to the northwest in close
coordination with the XVII r Airborne orps and to clear the area bordered by the Lenne River on the left, which was the common border
with the Airborne orps, and the Ninth Army area on the right, all the
way to the Ruhr River.
Operations on April 6 saw gains in the III orps area ranging from
3,000 to 5,000 yards against spotty opposition. The 99th Infantry
Divi ion captured Wingehausen and Musse, despite a determined counterattack which truck at the lines held by the 393rd Infantry (99th
Divi ion) just at twilight on thi date. The counter-attack, which was
led by several tanks and strongly upported by infantry, was repulsed
v. ith heavy lo se by the enemy.
Combat Command B of the 7th Armored Di vi ion overran Winkhau en and Graf chaft de pite increasing opposition. On the right flank
of the HI Corps area, the 9th Infantry Divi ion registered very small
gain during the day, capturing numerous small towns. The rate of a?vance wa held up, not by the oppo ition but by the adverse terrain
conditions.
On April 7, ub tantial succe s against the "pocket" was noted in
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the Ill Corps area. The 99th Infantry Division, on the left flank of the
corps area, gained 3 or 4 miles to establish front line positions just north
of Oberhunden and chmal lenberg. The city of Oberhunden was captured by the "Checker-boarders" after a bitter fight with the enemy
The Krauts had a small fortress ringing Oberhundcn, with numerous
ack-ack emplacements, morter, arti llery, and dug-in tanks.
The 7th Armored Division, in the center of the corps area, cleared
Schmallenberg and Gliedorf, on the headwaters of the Leone River
Gains were also made some 3,000 yards to the west, in a night attack in
coodination with the 99th Division.

An anri-tank crew takes ~helter behind some German farm houses in a small
Ruhr village.

The 9th Infantry Division aLhanced approximately two miles through
rough country to capture Rehsipen, an important communications center
The 99th Infantry Division on April 8 met heavy oppo~ition ar.
tf,ey attacked toward one of the main highways which crossed directly
in front of the III mps area, from cast to west. The enemy had
heavily fortified all the towns situated along this highway as well as many
natural landmarks. The doughboys found every town stubbornly defended.
l'xtensive use of the flak guns, which had been rlan:d here primarily
;1 •; defense of the Ruhr a1~ainst air <lltack, was noted. The 99th Di\ ision
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CJPtl1:red Wormbach, Felbecke, Worpe, and Saalhausen after fierce oppo · 1t1on by the Panzer Lehr Division, which was opposing our advance
down the Lenne River valley.
The 7th Armored Divisi on also met with stiff opposition during
the day and registered on ly small gains. However, despite the small
milage won, the tankers more than made up for this in the numbers of
enemy armored vehicles destroyed in the attack on Fredeburg, where the
Panzer Lehr Division defended with many armored units. Our tankers
suceeded in capturing the town and destroyed numerous enemy vehicles.
The 9th Infantry Division on the corps right flank progressed a
mile through the wooded region around Bodefeld and Wester Boderfeld.
The 47th Infantry (9th Division) reached out in a swift flanking movement to estab lish contact with the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment
(17th Airborne Division attached to the 8th Armored Division) of the
Ninth Army on the banks of the Ruhr River near Meschede. This bold
move considerably shortened our Jines and set the stage for the next move
of the III Corps, a swift knife-like attack all along the corps front whid1
would see the eventual destruction of all German opposition in the Ruhr
Pocket.
bn that morning of April 9, the III Corps was to burst forth
with new fury. The 99th Division, attacking with all three regiments
abreast jumped across the Lenne River in a lightning move and captured
the town of Bracht, some 4,000 yards beyond.
Bracht, a mwn which was on the right flank of the 99th Div. area, was situated
on an important mou nrain road to offer a trong defense, particularly against
the 7th Armored Division operating on the flank. Jc was also a thorn against
the side of the 394ch Infantry (99rh Di vision). On the 8th of April the air
OPs spotted rhe enemy reinforcing the town with some 30 troop-laden trucks
and half a dozen artillery pieces. The air OPs called for artillery fire. All
through che nighr the front line soldiers could hear the screams of wounded
Krauts and smell the pungenr odor of burning gas, wood, and flesh as the
artillery pounded away. Early on the mornin,!l of April 9, rwo flights of air
support swooped Jown on the town and bombed and strafed it, laying every egg
on thl' target area. The artillery and mortars continued to fire away. The
second our barrage lifted rhe !st Battalion, ~94ch Infantry (99rh Division)
swarmed down from the hills and entered the town. In a half hour they were
through the rown and sirring on the high ground on the other side.
-From "Barde Babies, The History of che 99ch Infanrry Division," by Maj . Gen. Walter Laver.

The 99th DiYi ion now advanced with the three regiments reading
f1 om left to right, 395th, 393rd and 394th. The remainder of the area
~c1uth of the Lenne River was cleared and the bridgehead north of the
river was rapidly expanded. The Checkerboarclers were some four mile~
north of the river by days end.
The 7th Armored Division al o experienced hard fighting during
the day and cleared Fredeburg. The division 's left flank also participated
in the action pre' iously described at Bracht, and patrols penetrated the
enemy held territory as far as Kobbenrode. The right flank of the
corps was near Mai lar.
The 9th Infantry Divi ion continued to press its attack on its last
day in action in the Ruhr Pocket by advancing its 60th Infantry through
the hitth hills e1st of Altenipe and just south of Ober Rarbach. The
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terrain was exetremely difficult as numerous streams had their headwaters
i;1 this area and one high cliff after another had to be transversed.
The 9th Infantry Division was relieved by the 5th " Red Di amond "
Infantry Di visi on at the close of the <lay on April 9. The 5th Division
passed through the lin es of the 9th Division and pressed the attack on
into the heart of the "Fatherland. " The 9th Di visi on was pulled back
briefly in corps reserve and later rejoined the V Corps, to which it had
been previously attached, and participated in later action against th e enemy
in the vicini ty of the eventua l link-up with the Russ ian Army on the
Elbe River.
On April 10, the 99th Division pressed its attack northward with
the 395th Infantry capturing Meggen. Other units of the 99th Division
turned into "mountain goats" as they attacked into the heart of the Lenn e
Mountain Range, and it would truly take mountain goats to traverse
that terrain, much less fight in it. The units in this area captured
Elspe and Odingen.
Elements of the 786th Tank Battalion and and the 99th Cavalry
Reconnaisanse Troop (both attached to 99th Division) were rushed to
Altenhunden late in the day to protect the 99th Di vision flank after the
er..emy had thrown several severe counter-attacks into the lines of the 86th
Division, which adjoined the 99th Division sector.
The 7th Armored Division moved forward to capture Dermecke and
Elsohe. The 7th Armored was bu ·y clearing the triangle formed by the
forks of the Wenne River, which Aows northward to the Ruhr near
Arnsberg.
Heavy action on the north Aank of the l!T orps area highlighted
the days action on April l l. The 5th Infant ry Di vision advanced its
2nd Infantry into Weninhau en and its 10th Infantry Regi ment to
Hel!efeld. The 5th Division was busy maintainin~ contact with the 7th
Armored Division on its left Aank and the Ninth Army on its right,
often times attacking enemy positions not knowinll where friendly forces
were located. The 5th Division arti llery support was extremely limited
a; a fire order prevented them from firing too far in front of the infantrv
for fear of hitting Ninth Army units, fighting along the north bank of
the Ruhr River.
The 7th Armored Di vision took ch lipruthen and Salway to highlight their action for the day.
The 99th In fantry Di vision gained on ly negligible territory to
capture Serkenrode.
On April 12, the 5th Divi ion advanced severa l miles to reach
Fnkhausen, an important communication center, which wa captured
after a bitter light. The well defended town was a control point for
all enemy operation in the area facing the III orps. Tn the meantime
the 7th Armored Division advanced west to Langenholthausen from
which point CA-~th Ar~oml Divis ion attacking throu.~h the 5th
Division advanced eight miles along the west shore of clrnpe Lake to
Hovel. Meanwhile CCR-7th Armored Division advanced southwest to
a line between ,arbeck and Wintrop. These moves caught the enemy off
guard and large numbers of enemy PWs were taken during the day,
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not as much from their desire to surrender but rat:1er fro:n being surprised at finding large American units roaming at will through their
rear areas.
The 99th Infantry Division continued to adnnce along the corps ue3:
or left flank meeting erratic oppos ition. Numerous enemy supply dumps
were over-run and many PW 's were taken. The 394th Infantry (99th
Division) captured Endorf, where the following order issued by the 338th
\'{ferhmacht Infantry Division was captured, which truly depicts the
condition the enemy was in.
"To take effect immediately: Troops will buy up all catt!e (except one cow and
pig per farmhouse) as well as all provisions and warehouse supplies . .. because
of the limited ration sicuacion, a decrease of one half size of portion of each
portion of each element of the ration is unavoidable ... "

The actions now shifts again to the right flank of the III Corps are1
in the Ruhr, where the 5th Division was advanci ng in a very narrow
corridor, or front, of only six miles in width. On April 13 the 2nd
I11fantry (5th Division) had moved to "l'1ithin sight of Elsborn and
Ashbeck, and was seriously engaged with the enemy in that sector. The
10th Infantry (5th Division) was fighting near the Ruhr valley towns
of Holsen and Boclmm.
Combat Command A, 7th Armored Division, encountered heav"{
resistance during tne day as it met dug-in infantry, mortar, artillery, and
tr.nk units. The advance was slowed, but not the destruction showered
on the enemy units who dared to oppose our tankers. CCA- 7th Armored
Division captured Dieling, which was one of the best defended strong
points in the entire Ruhr. The 7th Armored Division now found themselves in the point of an attack with the heart of the Ruhr valley lying
before them. Down in the valley to their front was the industrial center
of Iserlohn and far through the hazy mist could be seen the smokestacks
of Hagen and Dortmund. CCR- 7th Armored Division captured the
town of Neuenerode.
The 99th Infantry Division on the left flank encountered very difficult
terrain that held up their ath'ance to some extent. Fighting and climbing
i.:.p, over and under one mountain after another, the fighting Checkerboard Division moved exhausted and tired from one Battleground to
arother. Whenever the enemy dared to oppose their advance, the dogt1red doughboys under the command of Maj. Gen. Lauer, would swarm
at the enemy like demons, intent only on destruction, and destroy thev
did. The 99th Division captured over 4,000 prisoners during their
operations in the Lenne Mountains on April 1 3 alone. The 99th Division on this date captured Eiringhausen, Srefonal, and Garbeck.
April 14, it will be recalled , was the day the XVIII Airborne Corps
split the Ruhr Pocket in two near Hagen. That link-up left two major
German pockets yet to be cleared in the Ruhr, one on the east shore of
the Rhine from Dusseldorf to Wuppertal and the other a small triangle
formed by the junction of the Lenne and Ruhr Rivers, roug~ly from the
large town of Altena north to Menden , with enemy forces also still
opposing the First Army west of the Lenne River in the 86th Division

Close coordination berween the Infantry and Armored unics was very much in evidence throughout the Ruhr Pocket campaign.
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area. Compressed in this small area were unknown numbers of the
enemy. The city of Iserlohn was the center of the area, and from there
al: enemy operations were directed.
On April 14, the 5th Division continued to close in on the east
pocket of troops and met considerable opposition from self-propelled
SS's. An advance of 10,000 yards brought the 5th Division to the Ruhr
north of Menden. The 7th Armored Di vision mopped up the rear after
its rapid advance of the previous day and advanced a few miles to Herner.
The 99th Di vision advanced 6,000 yards to clear Ihmert and Westig,
OH the outskirts of Jserlohn, where a defense line was set up in the
expectation of an enemy counter-attack, as a large German force was
known to be located in Iserlohn.
In the last few days of the Ruhr campaign, the prisoner situation
became almost hopeless. Often a sing le GI guard would start to the
rear with perhaps ten German prisoners. As the procession would move
down the road, additional Germans would run out of the woods, or
houses, and join the column of PW's. On one occasion two infantrymen
started to the rear with 18 prisoners. As the group moved down the
road to the rear whole companies of Nazis would come down out of
the hills and surrender to the two lone GI's. When the column reached
the point where the regimental PW co llection point was supposedly
located, it was found that the whole set up had moved. The two doughs
felt themselves in a hopeless situation. Here they were with several
h11ndred pri oners, many of them still armed, in the dark of night, with
no way to rid themselves of their burden. The Jone pair ordered all of
the Germans to Iie on the ground, and the two doughboys then separated
ar.d guarded the prisoners from opposite sides of a large, newly plowed
barley field. They kept up their vigil all night, and when dawn came
a patro l found them and escorted them to the new location of the
regimental PW collection point, where they turned their prisoners over
t·· the MP . When the prisoners were counted it was found that the
t\\o GI' had spent the night with over 800 former super men.
April 1 5 was a day of unusual tvents in the III Corps area. The
90th Division attacked at 0600 and town after town was captured during
the morning with so many prisoners streaming in that the infantry
rq~iments found it difficult to advance. It was evident that the enemy
forces were disintegrating and that the co llapse of the Ruhr Pocket wa~
near at hand . Enemy re istance was rather scattered, with many enemy
soldier opposing the American advance with token small arms Ji.re
followed by surrender. But this token resistance managed to inflict casualties upon our force ·. The 393rd Infantry (99th Division) overran the
towns of Utterlingsen , Dahle. Vettenscheid, Altena, Evingsen, and Nette.
or the above mentioned towns, the most important, both from a
military and civilian angle, was Altena. Altena was a fair ly lar~e town
situated in a narrow 'alley hemmed in by high mountains on each side of
the river. The Lenne Ri,er is some 300 feet wide at this point and
separates the town into two portions. Large three story brick buildin~s face
the river and ( rom these enemy ob~ervers were operating.
Defendin1\ the town in force wa the Panzer Lehr Division, one
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c,t Hitler's cr,1ck outfits. As the 393rd Infantry (99th Division) attacked
the town, the 3tf3rd In fan try ( 86th Division) attacked over the hills
overlooking the town . to lend any support needed in eliminating the
German gMnson. As 1t turn<.:d out the support was not needed, for the
99th Division cap~ured the town, its entire garrison and the Commanding
General of the Panzer Lehr Division , General Von Hausen. Over 200
men from the. Panzer. Lehr Division alone were cap~ured in Altena by
the 99th D1v1s1on, while some 1,000 more of its members were corraled
by the 86th Di' ision, on the right flank of the XVIII Corps.
In the sector assigned the 395th Infantry (99th Division) , the
~loughboys. bounced ahe,td to capture Kesbern, with two battalions racing
into the nllage to capture the entire garrison. This regiment then went
i1!tO reserve to support the main 99th Division effort of the day, the assault
on Iserlohn, the larget German city ever to be attacked by the 99th
Division in the war.
Using all three of its battalions, the 394th Infantry (99th Division)
stormed the city, and the enemy garrison defended it with everything
it had. The light lasted throughout the day and casualties suffered
by the 99th Division were he<tvy. The die-hard Nazi defenders re isted
with the order "Die to the last man" as their battle cry. But not all the
enemy troops were SS, and hundreds of members of the Volkstrum and
Wehrmacht surrendered, if there were no SS officer around to drive
them on.
\Xlhile the light for the city of lserlohn raged on. a task force
composed of the 3rd Battalion, 395th Infantry (99th Division) and
clements of the 7th Armored Division. approaching from the north
.u::d east, overr.1n <l Germ,tn POW camp in the town of Hcmer. Herc
crowded in a small enclosure were ~ome 23,000 allied POWs, consisting
mostly of Poles and Americans, but with some Russians. They were
a starving mass of humanity, some 23,000 men crowded in an area not
l;•rge enough to hold 1,000 men.
Major Gcn<.:ral Waltn Laver, CG of the 99th Infantry Division ,
describes the scene as follows:
le was a horrihle sight to see chese human beings squeezeJ inw the limited area
of cheir open air stockade, diRµin,1: in the .i:round wich cheir bare hanJs, searchin.g, grovelinl(, fiµhcing for grubs and worms w eat. They had !lone without
food for over a week and were dyin,g like DDT'd flies. As our leadinR troops
arrived at I lem,~r. tlw German gua rds fled, and thousands of these poor, scarvcd
wretches broke out of their prison scockadc and flooded the rnuncry~ide in search
of food. They ransacked every pl.ice they came across, hunting only for somech ing to eat.
Through interpreters we were fortunately able to stop rhe exodus of the entire
camp by assuring groups of chem that food was on che way. It did arrive in
the matter of an hour. Many who broke away came back quickly when word
spread that food was bcin!l distributed . This incident, how<:ver, required che
services of one encire infantr}' battalion, which had co be withdrawn from the
accack on lserlohn co maintain order in the vicinity of the camp. Ju the POW
camp icself, in the very building housing the sKke,t of the pri oners, the
Germans had chree dying men to che bed. The German µuards lived in luxury
in the same hospical building, cwo guards co a nxim. How so-called civili1ed
ht•man beings muld treat ocher human in such :in omra,1:eous fashion surp.1s c:d
.ill understanding. As we cook over .ind brou.!lht them focd and medical arren-

These a.re the living quarters of slave laborers who were forced by the Germans co work long hours in the nearby Ruhr coal mines. Three men were
assigned co each bed. There were some sick, half starved men still lying under
the blankets when this picture was taken.
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cion, the German guards who remained were dismayed that we hurled chem out
of their rooms an<l placed fatally sick soldiers in chem.
-From "Battle Babies, the cory of the 99th lnfantry Division."
-An Outstanding Unit History, by Maj. Gen. Walter Laver.

till the battle for I erlohn continued, by late afternoon it was
evident that here was a tough nut to crack. The enemy defenders of
Iserlohn would not budge an inch, every attack ciade on the town by
the 99th Division would gain only a few yards and then halt, as the
SS defenders would pour a steady tream of fire down on our dough boy , who were out in the open without much cover.
On April 15 alone five German tanks were destroyed by the 99th
Division in front of Iserlohn. ITundreds of German lives were needlessly
lost by the idiotic fight which was taking place. Practically al I the
re.st of the Ruhr Pocket, even the troops adjoining theci on elch side.
had collapsed, but still the
officers ordered, "Die in the defense of
the Fatherland ," and that many of them did. It is only regrettable that
many American boys likewise had to die because of this frant;c defense
of Iserlohn.
During the night of April 15, the 99th Division dug-in along the
outskirts of Iscrlohn and remained in place, throwing back several tank
Jed counter attacks.
On April 16, the small pocket which remained in the eastern half
oi the Ruhr after the original pocket had been cut in two, sudden ly
without any warning col lapsed, and from out of everywhere treamed
German soldier , in battle dre s, to surrender. On this day alone the
99th Di vi ion took 2 3,000 prisoner , as the German forces (everywhere
except at Iserlohn) surrendered. Eight ,enerals were captured on this
date.
As the 394th Infantry attacked Iscrlohn, where no ign of urrender
had been noted, the rest of the 99th Divi ion attacked around thc town
on each flank.
Jn mid -morning all III orps force were ordered to halt in place
pending an expected mass urrender. The 7th Armored Division G was
at that time negotiating with the enior German commanders in the area.
and a truce had been called which was to end at noon . While this
negotiation was proceeding, two unit facing the 99th Divi ion took the
opportunity to surrender, these were the XLVII Panzer Corp and the
3rd Panzer Grenadier Di\ ision . Thousands upon thousands of enemy
oldiers poured through our line , much to the amazement of the front
line doughboy who were itting in po ition ready to resume the attack
at noon .
At 1135 the German forces surrendered to the TH ,orps with a
mas urrendcr to take place immcdiately. But this did not include the
Nazi garrison within I erlohn. o at once the 39tfth Infantry (9911,
Division) resumed the attack on the city. However during the lull in
the battle, many of the defenders lost their will to resist and after an
hour more of battle. the ~arrison surrendered. Bv 1300 the 99th Divi\inn
wa in control of all of I erlohn. thus ended the two day sie,l!e of the
city, and thus ended all or~anized oppo ition in the eastern ha! f of tht>
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Ruhr Pocket. The 99th Division in the final phase of the Battle of the
Ruhr Pocket from April 5 through April 17, had recorded 44,240 POWs
as they passed through the gates of our prisoner camps. In turn they had
liberated far more than this number in Allied POWs and slave laborers

Thou ands of German Prisoners were crowded into our Prisoner of War
cockades throughout the Ruhr Pocket. Here the 740ch Tank Battalion guards
a large group in typically hilly Ruhr terrain.

CHAPTER 7
THE XVI CORPS ATTACK IN THE NORTH
One of the most 1wwerfu l attacks thrown at the enemy in the
European wa r was the punch de livered at the enemy pocket in the Ruhr
by the Ninth Army's XVI Corps. Th is attack was high ly co rd inated
with one by the First Army, and preceeded by about 24 hours, with
H-Hour being 0100 on April 5, wherea the First Army attack did not
begin in earnest until April 6. At first Genera l s·mpson alloted the XV f
Corps four division for its part in the Ruhr campaign, but three days
after the attack began, two more divisions plus a gli der infantry regi1~1en ~
and a cavalry group, at first organized in a task force of the XIX Corps,
was attached to the XVI Corps bringing the strength of the XV I Corp ~
up to the vast strength of six divisions.
As the drive to destroy the enemy forces trapped in the Ruhr rolled
i11to action, the XVf Corps, under the command of Mai. Gen. John B.
Anderson, faced the enemy on a line which generally faced the enemy
dug-in on the south bank of the Rhine I krne Canal and the Dortmundfms Canal. A natural water boundary separated the foes over the bigge l
stretch of the front. The XVI Corps units fac in,g the enemy were as
follow :
( a) The 17th Airborne Division, less the l9'1th Glider Infantry, held a front
line position facing the enemy on the right II.ink of the corps area , adjacent
to the Rhine River.
(b) The 79th Infantry Division was in position to the left of the I ~ th Airborne and held defensive position~ along the Rhinc-Tl crnc anal.
( c) The 35th Infantry Division was likewise in defensive positions along the
north banks of the canal.
( d) The 75th Infantry D ivision was on the left bank of the present XV I orps
awa. The 7 5th Division was the only XVI Corps unit on the offensive as of
April '1, they having only recently established a bridpehead over t he DorrmundEms Canal, which they were in the act of enlarµin!l for future corps use.
Attached co the 7 5th Division wa~ the I 16th Infantry Re~iment of the 29ch
Infantry Division .

Where the First Army units a{hancinA up from the south were
engaged in fighting in steep, hi ll y, he;ni ly wooded country, the units
of the XVI Corps found the terrain over \\ h=ch they were to fii!ht
vastly different. This territory, which could be compared with the Mississippi Delta country in our own nation, was a level plain, through whi h
many smal l treams and canals flowed, .rnd many lar~e cities and towns
were scattered throu,ghout the ilrCa of adv .rnce. As our forces mm eel into
the plain, it was evident that the enemy was determined lo take advantage
o( the many natural obstacles prm icled by nature. The ri,ers ,1nd c.ina ls
had all been tramformed into stron,I!; defense lines. and the thous,rnds of
e'lemy anti -aircraft po itions h.1d bten transformed into strong fortresses .
On April 5, the 75th Division rnntinuecl its advan e out of the
bi idgehead it held .Kross the Dortmund Fms ( 111,d and the .ttt,irhed
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116th_ Infantry (29th Division) cleared the town of Braumbauer. To
the nght, the 79th Division maintained its defensive positions along
the Rhine-Herne Canal and destroyed the locks on the canal.
On April 6, the 75th Division forged ahead against determined
German ~efend~rs t~ seize positions only two miles north of the great
German industnal city of Dortmund. The 75th Division repulsed an
enemy counter-attack near Castrop-Rauxel with heavy losses suffered
b7 the Germans.
On April 7, the entire XVI Corps struck out at the enemy in a strong
attack aimed at accomplishing the corps mission- to destroy the enemy
north of the Ruhr River.
·
At 0300 on April 7, the 79th Infantry Di vision attacked across
the. Rhine-Herne Canal in a drive aimed at the heart of the German war
machine, the heavy indu trial area of Essen, home of the Krupp Steel
Mills. The attack got under way before daylight, following a demonstration by the 17th Airborne Division. The 79th Division jumped
across the canal and met the 2nd German SS Parachute Division as it
was moving parallel with the front to bolster German forces in the 75th
Division area. Hitting this powerful enemy unit in the flank, the 79th
Division attack succeeded in splitting the enemy forces, and disrupted the
entire plans of the foe in this 'area. As the corps engineers attempted to
build treadway bridges across the steep-banked Rhine-Herne Canal, the
infantrymen of the 313th and 315th Infantry (79th Division) pushed
on until they held a bridgehead of some five square miles.
In the meantime the 75th Division, still attacking on the left flank
of the corps area, moved into the outskirts of Dortmund , and succeeded
in repul ing another strong enemy counter-attack launched near the main
rail line leading into Dortmund. This was the second powerful attack
turned back by the 75th Division within the past two days. The massed
aiti llery fire of the entire corps continued to pour heavy interdiction
lire into the enemy troops opposing the 75th and 79th Divisions. As
these two units pres cd the attack into enemy positions on April 7, the
3'\th Divi ion, which was in the center, and the 17th Airborne Division ,
along the Rhine, al o continued in defensive positions along the RhineHerne anal.
April 8 found the 79th Infantry Division engaged in house to
house fighting in the vast factory area northeast of Essen, within sight of
the smokestacks of the Essen tee! Works. The "Cross of Lorraine"
Division, after suffering heavy losse , succeeded in cutting the Essenrelsenkirchen rail line, and E en wa~ cut off from the east. The total
Jdvance southward by the 79th Division for the day totaled less than
two miles.
Ju t to the right of the 79th Division, the 17th Airborne Division's
507th Parachute Regiment crossed the Rhine-Herne Canal and advanced
some two mile~ in the fac(! of stiff opposition tp take up positions west
of Essen.
( The Rhine· Herne Canal actually proved to be tO\lgher than the Rhine River
itself to cross Where rhe 79d1 Division cr~seq the canal it was a double
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waterway some 35 yards in wiJth. On each side of the canal were perpendicular walls some 20 feet high, with few places available for infantrymen to secure
a foothold .)

Meanwhi le, to the cast, the 35th Division and the 75th Division
bunched an attack which resulted in gains of some two miles for the day.
On Apri l 9, the XVI Corps attack was progressing very well with
the 35th "Santa Fe" Division attacking in force in the center of the corps
area with two regiments abreast. Striking south across the Rhine-Herne
Canal, the 134th and l 37th Infantry (35th Division) seized the town of
Herne and outflanked the city of Gelsenkirchen, with patrols actually
lighting within the city.
The 79th Division pressed its attack on Essen by advancing several
hundred more yards to seize the town of Steele and thus cutting German
forces north of the Ruhr into two pockets. Heavy enemy she!l fire, both
large ca liber and small arms was being received by all Ninth Army units
during the day.
On the right flank, the 17th Airborne Division advanced a few
hundred yard to take up better positions west of Essen.
Again the 75th Division received a severe counter-attack in its area
on the XVI Corp left flank. German forces crossed the Dortmund-Ems
anal in force and the 75th Division was forced to spend the greater
part of the day in defense. However this third enemy attack within three
chys wa repulsed and the 75th Division consolidated its positions as
the day came to an end.
As the XVI Corps was engaged in clearing the enemy forces throughcut the built-up area around Essen, Ninth Army Headquarters informed
the XVI Corps commander that the large "Task Force Twaddle," a
major portion of the XIX Corps, was being assigned to the XVI Corps
and as of this date, "Task Force Twaddle" bernme an oper-ating unit of
the corps.

Task Force Twaddle
When the final battle of the Ruhr commenced the XIX Corps was
as iµned the mission of clearing the eastern half of the Ruhr Pocket in the
Ninth Army area. At the same time the XIX Corps was engaged with the
enemy some 100 miles further cast, in the race to the Elbe River. In order
tt effectively maintain control over the XIX Corps troops till engaged
in the Ruhr, XIX Corps formed a task force, named "Task Force
Twaddle," under the command of Maj. Gen. Twaddle, CG of the 95th
Ir. fan try Division.
"Ta k Force Twaddle" became an operating unit on April 4 and
faced the enemy with the following units on line along the Ruhr front,
reading from right to left.
(a) The 95th Infantry Division assumed control over the area formerly held
by the 83rd Infantry Division. The 95th "Victory" Division front extended
roughly along the Lippe River and Canal west of Unna. The division was
attackiniz in the ge neral direction of D ortmu nd , which was the first objective
of the division.
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(b) The 8th Armored Division occupied front line posicions south and east
of Unna to W er! near the Rhine River.
(c) .Task Force Faith was .a task force of the larger Task Force Twaddle, and
consisted of the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment (17th Airborne Division),
and the 15th Cavalry Group, and this force was assigned the mission of maintaining contact with the First Army units on the left flank of the Ninth Army
as.v.:e!l as clearing the triang!e west of Merschede. The 377ch Infantry (95th
Divm?n) was attached co this separate task force for a period during the Ruhr
operations.

Prior to its assignment to the XVI Corps, "Task Force Twaddle"
had succeeded in clearing a large portion of the Ruhr Pocket in its
northeastern sector. On April 4, the day the force was constituted by
XIX Corps, the 95th Division attacked southwesterly from the vicinity
of Lippstadt, in the sector to the left and adjacent to the 75th Division.
To the left of the 95th Division was the 8th Armored Division. With
al! three regiments abreast, the 95th Division had crossed the Lippe River
en masse and had entered Wed, after a hard fight. In three days time
the 378th Infantry (95th Division) had driven from its bridgehead across
the Lippe-Sitten Canal to the outskirts of Hamm.
On April 5 a regiment of the 95th Division was battling for the
Hamm-Soest railroad line, which wa strongly defended. Meanwhile,
to the south and east, the 8th Armored Division was engaged in a hard
fight for the city of Korte.
On April 7, "Task Force Twaddle" captured the important road-net
town of Werl. The 95th Division cleared the northern half of the
town while the 8th Armored Divi ion entered and cleared the southern
half of the town.
Werl was the location of a large Luftwaffe air base
Pcisoner of War camp. Thousands of Australian
PWs were released and evacuated from this camp.
cans destroyed hundreds of German planes, which
unable to fly due to a lack of fuel.

as well as the site of a huge
and British Commonwealth
At the air base the Ameriwere caught on the ground,

ompany G, 379th Infantry (95th Division), captured a ·mall village
near \Ver! and ett!ed down for the night in billets next door to what
h:ippened to be a deserted prison. On searching the prison , a door creaked
open and a skinny, starved prisoner peeped out and suddenly .sho~ted
"English" and prisoners came out of nowhere from every d1_rect1on .
The explanation that it was Americans, not .English, that h~d liberated
them meant nothing. The thousands of Russians and Pob m the camp
tore into the remaining guards with their fingernails and had to be
forcibly removed from their former tormentors.
On April 8 "Task Force Twaddle" consisted of some 35,000 troops,
the equal of a c~rps. Atta~hed to "Ta~k Force Twad.d le" wa~. the srn:'lller
"Task Force Faith", prcv1ously mentioned. On th1 date.: Task l'orce
Twaddle" received its final mission in an order from XIX orps Head quarters. The mi ·sion was:
(a) Clear chc enemy west of Goseke, co a line near Hamm and Wickede.
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( b) The Sch Armored Division to continue attack west and at the same time
maintain contact with Task Force Faith.
(c) Task force Faith is co protect the left flank of the Ninth Army troops in
the Ruhr.

Their S guards murdered these Polish nationals, minutes before they were
co be liberated in a slave labor camp in the heart of the Ruhr.

April 8 saw "Task Force Twaddle" pushing teadily west, with the
great German city of Hamm falling to the 95th Division, Large stores
of war upplies were captured in Hamm.
In the advance on Hamm , two infantrymen of the 95th Division ,
Pfc. George Hyatt and Pfc. Hanies Howell , sighted a German convoy
crossing a railroad bridge. Hyatt grabbed a bazooka and fired a direct
hit which exploded a German truck loaded with dynamite. The explosion
rocked the countryside and denied the enemy the use of the bridge in
the defense of Hamm . The 95th Division at the end of the day had
acivanced to a point two miles outh of Hamm. The 8th Armored Division
had advanced eight miles and on the east flank of the task force area, the
I 9·1th Glider Infantry Regiment had made contact with First Army units
at Me chede.
The main body of the task force was, however. advancing steadily
toward Dortmund . with nna being threatened by our armored columns.
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The Combined XVI Corps Attacks
On A prif 10, the great imfustriaf center of Essen, better known :i:;
the "Pittsburgh of Germany" and site of the weJt Krupp s•eel r1 rx'· · .
ar.d heart of the German heavy armament industry, fell to the XIV orps.
As our doughboys advanced through the city, the enemy blew up anrl
blocked every major intersection . This was good evidence that tht'
Germans planned to wit hdraw their remaining units south of the Ruhr
River for a last ditch stand in more rugged terrain.
Essen felf to elements of the 17th Airborne Oivi ion, which occup;ed
the western sector of the city while the 79th Division captured the heart
of the city. Following the capture of Essen, the following news dispatch
was carried by the press at home describing the capture of the most
wanted German industriafi t, Baron Krupp.
The great Krupp works at Essen, arsenal of Kaiser and !•uhrer, lay dead.
For live years this steel heart of the German war machine had been a prime
target of allied bombers. Last week U .. Ninth Army men rolled past the
debris, and a few miles farther south over the highwalled Villa Hui.:cl, secluded
estate, of powerful, mysterious Alfred Krupp, silent partner of J\'aliism, now
wanted by the Allies as a war criminal.
A brace of Villa Hui.:el ret,1iners blocked the door. StrappinJ.( ( 6 foot 5
inches) Lieutenant Colonel Clarence a.i:mocn, ( -5, 313th Jnfantrr, 79th Infantry Division) merely drew his .15 colt and a passage opened.
Colonel ai.:mocn soon had his captive in tow - a thin, nervous man,
balding at 3 7 and trimly drc5sed in a pin-striped busine s suit. The American growled: "You bastards started this war and we'll show you who's
finishing it." He ordered the prisoner inro his jeep.
As the jeep pulled away ,t servant hurrie<l from the mansion with his
master's overnight bag. He was too late.
Jn the kitchen of an Fssen apartment, where a rei;:imencal command post had
hcen set up, the prisoner was interviewed.
IIis plant had heen shut down, he s.tid, since the l {eavy Allied ai:
raid of March 11. At that time upward of 50,000 workers, including L0,000
foreii;:n slaves were on the Krupp production line.
The Americans asked, 'Why clidn't you leave the Ruhr'"
Herr Krupp shrugized his bony shoulders: "! wanted to stay with my
factory where I beloni;:, with my follow workers."
"Are you a Nazi?"
"I am a German."
"Arc you a mc:mber of the , azi partyt"
"Well, yes, but most Gc:rmans arc."
"What is your present salary('
Herr Krupp was annoyed "Must I answer" he mapped . "Yes", olonel
agmoen mapped back. Herr Krupp lit a w:arettc from a silver ase puffed
anxiou ly, aid: "Four hundred thou .m<l marks a year."
( 160,000 at
official prewar exchange rates) All profits, he s.ii<l, had hcen plit bctwc:en the
azi government an<l his family.
" Do you still think the Germans will win the: war' "
" J do nor know, politics is not my husmess. My business is makinR stc:el."
The Americans thought of Krupp steel - the steel that went mw U-boats,
tanks, }(Uns. They thoui:ht especially of the " Krupp Cannon" - the famed,
dea<lly 88, de. rroyer of Allied men and machines .111 the way from Fl Alamein
to the Rhine. They askc<l a fin.II question .
"What are your plans after the war?"
Herr Krupp pondered . For live }(cncrations his f,1mily had fori:ed tee!
for ;1rms - for apoleon, for the Ifapshurgs, for the Ilohcnwllcrns, for the
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Nazis, for any customers with cash. They had made $200,000,000.00 in
World War I alone. They had profited even more fabulously - for a while
- in World War II. And now? - Herr Krupp, merchant of death, answered:
"J hope ro rebuild the factories and produce again."
-Time Magazine, Issue April 23, 1945
Reprinted from History of the 313rh Infantry in World Wat
JI, Infantry Journal Press. Reprinted by permission.

As the American forces neared the h eavily industrialized Ruhr section,
more and more of the slave labor camps were liberated. As these sgualid
iCamps were overrun, our soldier became more and more disgusted with
the German government and all it stood for.
Day after day we had een these Germans accept defeat with a shrug
of the shou lder, and one and all claimed they were " nix nazi. " But as
these slave labor camps were overrun, and we could see with our own eyes,
the cruel, inhuman, and indecent treatment these poor wretched souls
had received at the hands of the Germans, the more odious impression
most of us received of the Krauts.
Jn most of these camps the e foreigners, from Russia, Poland ,
France, Yugoslavia, and in fact all of the conguered, were crowded into

One of the famous azi "bake ovens'', used in a German concentration camp
liberated in the Ruhr, i pointed tO by a Frenchman, who was rescued a few
hour before he would have been cremated alive by his SS captors.
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enclosures thick as flies. Little care wa taken as to sanitation and medical
care. For the Germans, if a man became too sick to work, he was better
off dead. Food was partialed out to the pri oners in rations which couldn't
keep a small cat alive. And for any individua l who complained of thei•
treatment worse was in store- a horse whipping, at the hands of the
cmp commandant.
Yes, this was the way the so-ca ll ed super race treated the conquered.
It is hard to imagine how any supposed ly civilized peop le cou ld treat
any human being in the manner in which the slave laborers were treated .
At some of these slave labor camps, the inmate had not received
any food or water for four of five days prior to their liberation at the
hands of the Americans. As oon as the slaves were liberated, they at
once became a difficult problem to handle. Often thousands of them
would break away at once and start moving out across the country on
a looting expedition, in search of food. Naturally they also had pent up
feelings against the Germans which then unleashed on any and every
German in sight. Many combat units had to be withdrawn from the
fighting front in order to control these displaced/ersons, or slave laborers
The displaced per ons problem remaine all through the Ruhr
campaign. However, higher echelons of command set up a standard
procedl!re whereby all of these lave laborers were kept in their enclosures
after being liberated and fed, clothed and given medical treatment.
However, it eemed odd to the average American oldier to see the
Germans, who were the cause of this entire problem, going free and
told to rebuild their cities and raise a crop, while these poor souls whose
bodies and minds were warped by the cruel and inhuman treatr:1ent
n:ccived at the hands of these very ~ame German , were kept in the
e1·closures and forced to live in displaced per on centers.
However, as mentioned above, many of these DPs managed to break
out as they were freed and at once went on a shopping spree. When
they got out of control, looting became frequent, and the Germans were
the first to turn to the American authorities for protection. Their mem
ories were short, they seemed to forget the rape of Prance.
After the fall of Essen, the 79th Division swung eastward an 'I
captured Bochum, another great German steel mill city. Meanwhile,
a few miles to the east the 35th Divi ion captured I rerne. The 75th
Di\ is ion was meeting stiff resist.ince between Dortmund and Herne.
Thus at the close of day, on April 10, we find the western half of the
XIV Corps area with all its unit closing in on the corp.· nbjective, the
north bank of the Ruhr River. All the way from Dortmund west to
Duisberg, the Ninth Army had clo c:d to within two or three mile of
the Ruhr, .rn<l at some points. a <lefense line on the north bank of the
r1 ver had been establi he<l. To the east of Dortmund, in the area of
"Task Force Twaddle", now under control of XIV orps I Teadquarters,
the front line roughly para Iled the Ruhr River back some six or seven
miles from the river.
On April 10, the 9'.ith Division an<l 8th Armored Division fought
a desperate battle with crack
units just out ide of Dortmund. The
enemy at one pomt employed Tige:r T.1nks and several hun<lred inf.rntry
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Two lone infantrymen race down an alley in clearing one Ruhr town.

men in a furiou counter-attack aimed at relieving· the pressure on Dortmund . The 8th Armored Division bore the brunt of this attack and
succeeded in beating it off. The tankers followed up this success by
adrnncing to within a mile of Unna and captured Frodenburg.
On the extreme left flank of the corp area, the l 94th Glider
Infantry Regiment continued to clear its sector in the vicinity of Arnsburg,
and captured some 2,000 prisoners, many of them deserters.
Our soldier found " liberating" very good in the heavily built up
'<:ction of the Ruhr. As towns were captured by the GTs, the doughboys
knew that it was 1ery necessary that all watches, cameras, and binoculars,
a~ wc:ll as lugc:rs and military we,1pons, must be liberated. Many GI~
~l·c ured their favorite "war trophy " during the latter stages of the Ruhr
cJrnpaign. Then when the ma s urrenders took place on April 15 and
16, azi trench knives,
officers' pistols, etc. joined the huge stock
of liberated rn,1terial. ome officers frowned on the policy of liberating
from the enemy, while others took part themselYes. Despite the ruling
c-;1 fr,1ternizing, watches and lugers were not the only things liberated.
n April 11 , the: XIV orps cleared the entire north bank of the
Ruhr of enemy troops, except for a bridgehead the Germans still held
near Dortmund . Among the citie captured were Mulheim, Oberhau en,
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Witten, and Unna.
Unna fell jointly to the 8th Armored Division and 95th Divi ion .
This was an important communcations center and a well executed manuver
by the 8th Armored Division resulted in the city falling with a minimum
nun:i~er of casualties. With. the fall of Unna, the XIV Corps established
pos1t1ons along the Ruhr Rtver for forty-two miles from its mouth east
to the vicinity of Witten and then from Frondenburg east to Arnsberg.
After clearing Mulheim, near the mouth of the river, the 17th Airborne Division established a small briJgehead over the Ruhr and then
dug-in defensive positions to await the arrival of XVIII Airborne orps
known to be advancing from the south.
Nearby, the 79th Division captured the Kettewig Bridge and likewise
established a small bridgehead across the Ruhr before it too went on the
defensive.
The 35th Division marched through Bochum and advanced to the
Ruhr River west of Witten.
The 75th Divi ion advanced two regiments to the Ruhr and seized
the town of Witten. The remaining re_giment was used to contain the
enemy bridgehead south of Dortmund. There were some 1,000 German
SS troops holding this bridgehead which extended to nna and included
the city of Dortmund.
On tfie opposite side of the bridgehead, the 95th Division wa ·
exerting great pres·ure on the enemy force in the vicinity of
nna
which finally fell late on April I I and then the 95th Division advanced
to within three miles of Dortmund.
The 8th Armored Di\ision, with the 19tfth Glider Infantry Regiment
attached, was advancing at a rapid rate down the north bank of the Ruhr
River and was nearing the Dortmund area.
The Capture of Dortmund
On April 12 the l.lst major battle north of the Ruhr River took
place when a giant arm of steel surrounded the great city of Dortmund.
The XVI mps had the 75th Di\ision containing the Gcrmc1n forces on
the west, and the 95th Division, with clements of the 8th Armored
Di\ision driving in force on the city from the east.
The 95th Di\ ision entered the northern portion ()f the city and
slowly ath·anccd throu_gh a sector studded with minefields and road
blocks. The 95th Division secured a toe-hold in the city and on the
following morning, April I 3, the city of Dortmund fell to the 95th
Di\ ision of "Task Force Twaddle."
Then, after a rapid ad\·ance to the banks of the Ruhr, the last pocket
o: resistance in the XIV Corps are.1 was cleared. However, for several
more days m.my mall fire-fights took place with scattered, isolated enemy
units, which had been by p•med in the advance:. One prisoner taken
during the day was Lt. Gc:n. Fritz Dayerlein, CG of the Germ;rn LIIJ
Corps, who related that followin_g the: loss of
nna and Dortmund.
he: had received an order from Field Marshall Model to attempt to
break out of the pocket tow.ml the "west" with everything he had
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available.- This order was never acknowledged, answered, or obeyed.
Afte~ clearing their sector of the Ruhr, The XIV Corps set up a
defense !me along the Ruhr River, and just sat back and waited as the
XVIII Corps and III Corps drove the remainder of the enemy soldiers
mto theJC lap. A defense line along the river was maintained and
numerous high ranking prisoners were captured. Among the prisoners
taken by the XIV Corps in this battle were:
Fritz Schlessmann, Gauleiter of Essen
Lt. Gen. Josef Harpe, CG of the 5th Panzer Army
Franz Von Papen, former German Chancellor
But the big prize, the one wanted most out of the prisoner bag in
the Ruhr, was never found. He was General Model, who commanded
all of the German forces in the Ruhr.
General Model had found a solution to the surrender problem. On
April 17 he announced that German Army Group B was dissolved. The
men were dismissed, and thus Model avoided the responsibilities of a
surrender. Then he committed suicide.
It is hard to describe the scene as the entire German Force in the
Ruhr surrendered. \'<fhere only 24 hours before, these men were .our
enemy, and were involved in a life and death struggle, they seemed now
to be only meek little men. Even the big, German paratroopers, who
seemed tall and strong when seen a few days earlier leading an attack,
seemed to have shrunk in stature. There was definitely little fight left
in the enemy now as they lined up to enter the PW cages.
All along the Ruhr River at this time the scene was the same.
Thousands upon thousands of Germans were crowded together like scared
animals. The infantrymen who had fought down from the north, and up
from the Remagan bridgehead, gazed in wonderment at the thousands
of enemy oldiers we had captured. From high ranking field officers
down to the lowly lancers (private) they were one and all the safl)e now.
Also taken prisoner in the Ruhr were hundreds of German WACs, who
had been pres ed into service by the S as "soldier comforters." Call
them that if you want, but it was clear they were nothing but camp
fol lowers. But true to the German concept of the super race, only the
" " uni ts were assigned these "comforters."
Besides the thousands of prisoners captured, every civilian in the
area had to be carefully screened, a many of the SS men had changed into
civilian clothes and were attempting to hide and escape capture, by posihg
a~ civilian . However, this ru e did not work as every male civilian was
searched for the tell-tale tatoo, which always appeared under the SS troops
left arm .
Another trick tried by the Germans was to give out mass discharges
to whole units prior to surrender, and thus claiming a civi lian status to
escape the prisoner of war pen. But this did not work as our army did
not recognize a discharge given on such short notice.
Each day as the battle approached the climax in the Ruhr, more and
more prisoners were captured. The writer will always recall the occasion
ir the Ruhr when he was sent out on a patrol and his small group
captured about ten Krauts. Tn a nearby house, hiding in the basement
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with some women and old men, was a nattily dressed man of about 50
year of age, in a blue dre s uniform complete with braid. Our smal l
group, none of whom were well acquainted with German rank, or
uniforms, at once surmi ed that we must have a very high ranking German
officer as our prisoner. Perhaps it might be Himmler, Goebbel or no
telling whom. We all pictured ourse lves receiving a medal for our
capture of so high ranked an officer. As we made our way back to our
company, we walked all of our prisoners back through the woods for
some two miles, and another two miles along a rai lroad track to reach
cur battalion area. Then as we proudly walked up to the battalion PW
cage with our VIP prisoner we received a horse laugh. Our prisoner was
only a street car conductor. He was at once turned free, to walk back
home again, some four miles. His feet probably hurt, but not as much a~
our pride, by the time our buddie were through with us.

CHAPTER 8
COMBAT ACTION OF THE
FIFI'EENTH ARMY
Although war is hel I, no matte1 from what direction you look at it,
most any doughboy who saw front line duty would prefer the type of
warfare experienced by those infantrymen who took part in the phase of
the European war known as the " Defense of the Rh ine River line by
the Fifteenth Army."
Late in March, 1945, after the First Army had established the
Remagan Bridgehead and the Ninth Army was prepared to strike aero:;:;
the Rhine in a major amphibi ous assault, SHAFE ordered the U. S.
Fifteenth Army to be committed to action for the first time. The Fifteenth
Army, under the command of Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, was ordere-1
to asswne contro l of the front lines along the Rhin e Ri ver from Bonn
on the south to opposite Duisburg on the north. Durin g this enhe
stretch of front, the American forces were on an established defense line,
with the wide and swift Rhine River separating them from the enemy.
The infantrymen were dug-in along the river bank and behind the
low dirt dikes, which protected the lowlands from flood , while further
t·"J the rear the artillery units were du_g- in behind the tall fir tr¢es which
frequented the area. Many of the doughboys occup:ed comfortable billets,
or. the fir t floor of a house, with a machine gun nest or OP on the
upper floors of the same house. One sh uld not get the wrong impression
of this type warfare however, for despite its stationary character. whirh
was in direct contrast with the rap;d running warfare then go ing on across
the river in the pocket, men were wounded and died here the same
a~ elsewhere.
The Fifteenth Army assumed contro l of this 55-mi le stretch of th ~
front, al first manned by the following unit :
(a) l02nd lnfanrry Divhion manned the Rhine River defense Fne 'P ;,~
extreme northern portion, from Dusseldorf north to the
inrh Army area
above Duisburg. This settion of the frc nr was lacer turned over ro the 94rh
Infantry Division. which was in the process of moving up from France.

(b) 95th Infantry Division-At first the 95th Division assumed conrrnl
over the cenrer seccion of the front, bur in late Marcli it was turned over tn
the 9..,rh Jnfonrry Division and in early April the lOlst Airborne Div isio n was
used in rhis sector.
( c) The 86th Infanrry Division relieved the 8th Infantry Division on the
Rhine at Cologne and held a 26 mile sector on the fronr until April 4 when
the Black llawh were relieved by the 82nd Airborne Divi:.ion.

Aggre sive action in this sector was limited mostly to patrols aero~~
the Rhine, and there were n1J.ny of these. Otherwise the chief duty of
the three di\ isions holding the west bank of the Rhine was to keep a•
many enemy units JS po sible eng,1ged in order to relieve the pressure
0.1 the friendly units ad,,1ncinJ! into the Ruhr from both north and ~outh.
Day after day, the doughbov in this sector die.I their fightini• lonf!
di lance, by firing at 'isible targets on the far side of the Rh;n ':! Like' 1 i-c
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the enemy would occupy themselves by firing back at any movement from
our side of the river.
On one occasion during this phase of the war, a three man wire-laying party
was billeted in a house on the west bank of the Rhine, only a few yards from
the shore line. Af~er posting a security guard on the outside, two of the wiremen stretched out m a darkened room for a short cat-nap. Sometime during
their sleep, rhe power came back on in the house and a radio began co play.
The wiremen awoke to hear fluent German coming from rhe nexr room and
strangely every light in the house burning. The first thought to come co their
mind was that a German patrol had crossed the river and was overrunning
their position. After diving head first out a window the two men were
slightly embarrasssed, but relieved, to find their buddy ~rill standing security
guard on the outside of rhe house.

Yes, many amusing events took place during the so-called "Watch
on the Rhine" by the Fifteenth Army. As this was a territory occupied
by many devout Nazis, much sabotage was noted. In some sector German
agents were caught flashing signals across the Rhine to their troops, giving
away the disposition of American troops. Nightly a patrol had to be
dispatched along the river to shoot out the light bulbs wh ich were lighted
during the day near targets, to guide the 88 fire.
A lthough casualties were lighter in this sector than elsewhere in the
Ruhr, the German artillery and machine gun fire did resu lt in many
purple hearts.
The author, who took part in this pha e of the Battle of the Ruhr briefly, before
being moved with his outfit around to the flank for the drive into the heart
of the Ruhr district, recalls very well one doughboy who received a moderately
severe wound in what we shall call an embarrassin,11 place - an unmentionable
pface. As the wound did not require evacuation, the soldier was present when
the regimental commander awarded medals and purple hearcs at the end of
the Ruhr engagement. As the regimental commander handed each man his
purple heart, or pinned it on his blouse, he would ask him where he was
wounded. The typical answer was - leg - arm - chest - leg - ankle
- face. But when the colonel r<.>ached this individual he received a different
an wer - "at Cologne."

To the lowly enlisted man this battle was strange and c nfused.
Here were three American division waiting on the west bank of the
Rhine, with a disorganized enemy on the far hore. Daily rumors wou ld
come and go that at such and such time the troops on the we t bank
would stike across the river in assault boat and jump into the battle to
clear the Ruhr.
On one occasion a platoon of infantrymen were run out of their billers for a
hush-hush meedng between the regimental commander and a large group of
company and battalion commanders. A frer the conference was over, the doughboys returned to their billets and right there on rhe table one of the officers
had forgotten and left his briefcase. At once a look-out was placed at the
door and a "looting party" was underway, pilfering through the officer's briefcase hoping to find ouc whar was in store for rhis unit. Abouc thi time the
regimental Commander returned for his briefcase and surprised the look-our
who was unable to give a warning. He walked right up be ide che GI who
was rhe ring-leader. When the doggie looked up and saw the old man standing there you could have knocked lwn over with a toothpick. The regimental
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CO made one memorable statement-"Just make sure you get them all back in
-soldier" .

. De pite the rumors which always flowed, the men defending the
Rhine Rrver line had an unusual chance to view the war. As the First
Army units moved up along the east bank of the river, doughboys in OP~
along the west bank could often witness large tank battles on the opposite
side of the river, or could get a birds eye view of German units preparing
to attack or withdraw in the face of the First Army offensive.
Besides, for those who really liked adventure, they could volunteer
for one of the patrols which were sent across the Rhine River almost every
night. Pfc. Lloyd D an iels was one who went on one of these patrols, this
one actually crossed the river one night, stay~d th~ough the next day, and
returned the following night. Here is the way that Pfc. Daniels described
this occasion.
"Our patrol consisted of six members beside myself. We slipped down to the
banks of tbe river about midnight and launched our rubber boat. It was pitchdark and our boat kept spinning around and around as we tried to make headway against tbe current. We finally reached tbe shore almost a mile downstream from where we started.
aturally our patrol was scared stiff, but greatly
relieved to know we bad reached shore without being detected by tbe Krauts.
A few yards up the bank we deflated our rubber boat and hid it under some
driftwood. After bypassing some barb-wire we made our way inland - ours
was a reconnaissance mission, wirb instruaions to take a few prisoners. About a
half mile frcm tbe river we sighted a pair of Germans standing guard, evidently
around some type of installation. Our sergeant left the patrol and was gone
about a half-hour scouting. When he came back he whispered that tbe Germans appeared to be guarding a road junction, and we surmised that tbey were
MPs. Our entire patrol crawled forward to within a few yards of where they
stood and upon a signal from the sergeant we jumped tbe two Krauts. Fortunately they were not much in tbe mood for resistance, or else they were taken by
surprise. Nevertheless they were captured and we at once moved them back
several hundred yards from the road and tied them in a wooded area. One of
the men spoke broken English and was very talkative. He complai ned of the
rations he had been receiving and apparently welcomed capture. He related
that he had been fed only potato soup for the past ten days.
At daybreak we hid in some woods about a half-mile from the river. We
had good visibiliry from where we hid and on one occasion received quite a
scare when a group of some 30 or 40 "gray-tails" (i.e. Germans) passed
through the far end of the woods, evidently searching for their lost comrades.
Toward evening a German civilian stumbled onto our woods and we were
forced to keep him with us for security reasons, much ro his protest. He was
bound and placed with the two German prisoners. Shortly after dark three
of us went back ro the road junction, which was no longer under guard, and
placed several mines we had brought with os at the intersection. As soon as
we returned rhe whole patrol started to withdraw to the river. As soon as our
boar was located and inflated, we loaded the prisoners aboard, turned the
civilian loose and shoved off for the far, and friendly shore. As we climbed up
the west bank of the Rhine we considered ourselves lucky. We had spent over
30 hours behind rbe enemy lines and had never been detected and had not been
shot at. Besides we bad accomplished our mission by returning with two
prisoners for interrogation.

The patrols which crossed the Rhine were not all as lucky as the
c;ne just described. More often the Germans would discover the patrol
about half way acros the river and after an OP would hoot a flare into
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the air, bringing broad daylight to the entire area, an arti ll ery barrage
would be leveled on the helpless men, and often a patrol would be destroyed in the middle of the river, right in front of their buddies.
Life in the bi! lets was far from enjoyable al o, as the Germans were
well armed with 88s and "screaming Minnies' and were determined to
use up what ammunition they had left before their capture. Once the
enemy located a building being used for a billet, a constant barrage would
fall on the spot. This saturated shel l fa ll resulted in many casualties.

A machine gun crew watchc\ for a target on the opposite bank of the Rhine
a~ American 15th Army units light from billets in conducting a holding action
along the Rhine from Bonn, north thru olognc and Dusseldorf to near
Wcscl.

There is little that one can write ,tbout 111 this p.tflicuhr are:i of the
nuhr Pocke:t, ,is like WC: ~t.tted pre:\ 1ously, the. three di\ i~ions holding the
\\est bank of the: Rhine h,ul the wide and swift ri1cr between them ;tnd
t 1l'' enC:ffi/.
On April 5. when the 1nth .ind First Arm :es unle.1shed thur att.tck
tu elim111ate the Ruhr Pocket, the XXII Corps defended the. Rhine Ri\er
l•ne usins.: the 91th fnfantry Di\iS100, the lOl~t Airborm: D1>ision, and
the 82nd Airborne Div1s1011 .
These three ve'er;111 div·•1011s rnnt111ucd to hold the defcn~e Jin<'
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until the "pocket" was close~ some ten days later. Like their co-patriots
who were fightmg and flushmg the enemy out of his lair in actual close
combat, these units played an important part in the defeat of aJJ German
units in the Ruhr.

Finis
. A strange quiet ::ett!ed over the Ruhr River Basin on the morning of
April 20, 1945 . The vast industrial plants which once turned out war
suppli es for the German army were lying in ruin. The coal m iners were
idle. Streets, roadways, bridges. railro1d stations - all that once made
Germany great - were now rubble. The German civilians seemed dazed
from the rapid turn of events, and as an aftermath of the battle which
had raged over their heads for the p1st (ew weeks. Occasionally a brief
fury of shell fire would ring out in the hills as an American patrol continued to round up stragglers of the once proud \'V'ehrmach - Nazis who
were attempting to hold out in the hills.
It was only a few short weeks ago that the latest propaganda posters
(:istributed by the Nazi government read "Give me fi ,re more years and
yc.u will not recognize Germany again"
this statement was signed by
Ado lph Hitler. Now the bubble of a greater Germany had burst in their
face. The once gre:tt cities of the Ruhr
Cologne, Hagen, Hamm,
\V/uppertal, Dussc:Idorf, Dortmund
were all in ruin; 90 per cent destroyed. Many of the foctories . in fact a vast majority of them, were
kn:led to the ground. The residential area<;, once occupied by the factory
worker~. h1d been i;utted by fire and only the skeletons of the houses now
stood.
Where emu: the S ofl'icers swaggered up and down their streets.
!\, in dirty gray oli\e dr,tb uniform,, many <if them in their teens, had
come from thousands of miles acro~s the ocean and now occupied their
nlie . Long columns of replacep1cnts constantly poured along the autob:,hn~ p.1ssing throu11h the Ruhr. These replacements moved forward
tu join in the battle which wa~ now taking place some 1 50 miles further
e.:sl. where GI Joe ,rnd h an were soon lo link up to cut Hitler's Gcn"lan
empire in half.
The units which had fought and won the Battle of the Ruhr were
on the move again. omc of the units. <uch as the 8th Infantry Division,
were rushing forw.ml to join the British 2nd Armv in the drive to the
·orth ca, w hile other units, such as the 86th Di vision and the 99th
Division went south to join Patton' Third Army in the drive into Bavaria
(On April 20th, the 8th Jnfanrrv Division, 86th Division and the 97th Iafancry Division were all s:ruated side bv s:de after comoletin? the mop-up in the
Ruhr. The three divisions had fought with the XVIH Airborne Corps. Some
two weeks later the 8th Division was in chwer:n and Wismar, on the North
ea. The 97rh Division was in Pilsen. Czechoslovakia, and the 86th Division
was at alzburg, Austria. only ren miles from Berchcesi;aden, Hitler's famous
retreat. This indicates the speed with which our forces were able to move as
rhey raced across central Europe. Here rhe 8th and 86th Divisions. which had
fouµht together in the Ruhr, had !(one in opposi te directions and were now
( V-E day) occupying opposite corners of German-held territory.)
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After the collapse of the German force in the Ruhr, the entire area
was turned over to the Fifteenth Army Military Government units. Some
of the divisions which had taken part in the Ruhr engagement were
a~.signed occupation duty in the area, while others such as the divisions
mentioned above, plus the 13th Armored, 82nd Airborne Division, 1Olst
Airborne Division, 99th Infantry Division, and perhaps others saw
additional combat service before V-E Day.
In retrospect, we can look back upon the Battle of the Ruhr Pocket
as the world's biggest battle, from the standpoint of the number of
soldiers participating. But the most important thing to remember conconcerning this battle was the fact that in this battle, the enemy lost all
wntrol of the war, and from this time on was able to muster only token
resistance to the advance of the Allied troops. Besides this factor, the
Germans also lost one entire Field Army of 325,000 men.
In the joy of final victory, the world paid little attention at the
time to the Battle of the Ruhr. The link-up with the Russians, the suicide
of Hitler, and the fall of Berlin dominated the news. But while these
more glamorous affairs were occuring nearby, and news correspondents
flocked to other ectors, the fact remains that in the Ruhr the German
Army lost for once and for all the elite of the army, the crack Army
Group "B", as well as portions of the First Parachute Army.
The years will come and ,go, and World War IT will best be
remembered by uribachi , Pearl Harbor. and Bastogne, but the American
combat soldiers who fought against all types of obstacles to I iquidate
the Ruhr Pocket contributed far more to the overall victory than is
indicated at first glance.
It has now been twelve long year since the Battle of the Ruhr took
place. As the veterans of this engagement look back over these twelve
years a great chanµe has taken place in the world . Nations that were
our friends and allies then are our enemies now.
ations that we
fought to the bitter end only twelve yeus ago, from outward appearances,
are now our friends. A new generation has come along, and the atrocities
which we witnessed, have been forgotten . The bitterness that was in the
heart of almost every soldier who saw with their own eyes the concentration camps, and slaughter-hou e laboratories of the Nazis, has to
a great extent waned. The past tw<:lve years ha seen another war
in far off Korea, where perhaps even ,greater atrocitie occurred. There
have been wars and rumor of wars during thi entire period
Today we mo'e into a future of uncertainty, little knowing what
i; in store for u in the years to come. But to those who took part in the
Battle of the Ruhr, or for that matter any battle, no matter how large
or small, there is no glory in W<tr, no one ever wins anythin~. The loser
is always mankind .
Let us hope that our children, grandchildren, and their children
after them, are able to come up with the solution to the problem that is
a5 old as the world it elf, how to encl wars for once and for all. Then
perhaps the entire world can for once enjoy " Peace on earth , and ~ood
will to man ."

